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INTRODUCTION 
N 1977, the Associate General Counsel for the Federal Com-
munications Commission (“FCC”), J. Clay Smith Jr., de-
fended his agency’s rules requiring broadcasters to ensure “equal 
employment,” a term whose meaning was still being made.1 Smith 
argued that the FCC “has the authority and responsibility to con-
sider the provisions of the United States Constitution and the pub-
lic policies established thereunder.”2 Accordingly, the FCC had 
ample authority, Smith asserted, to deny licenses to broadcasters 
with discriminatory hiring practices. In fact, Smith continued, the 
Fifth Amendment likely obligated the FCC to require equal em-
ployment.3 
I 
Smith’s view was not anomalous. Civil rights advocates began 
pressing African Americans’ constitutional right to join unions and 
access decent jobs before administrative bodies in the 1940s.4 By 
the 1960s, administrators began to make similar arguments from 
within government, setting off debates among officials about the 
constitutional duties of administrative agencies and the businesses 
they oversaw. 
Administrators like Smith argued that equal protection obli-
gated agencies to require that the companies they regulated en-
sured equal employment. These officials also asserted that regu-
lated companies were themselves constitutionally compelled to 
1 J. Clay Smith, Jr., Assoc. Gen. Counsel, FCC, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (June 25, 1977) (Leadership Confer-
ence on Civil Rights Papers, LCMD, part I, box 101, “FCC - FCC, 1978” folder) (all 
archival sources are on file with author). Equal employment has come to be defined 
narrowly by employment discrimination litigation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2006). The reader is invited to 
hear in this term not what it has come to mean under Title VII, but the multiple and 
contested meanings it retained during the events chronicled here. Likewise, the lim-
ited meaning of equal protection and its correlate, discrimination, in current constitu-
tional doctrine had not been consolidated during the period this Article recounts. See 
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1537–38 (2004). The 
current legal definition of discrimination is not capacious enough to express the con-
stitutional obligations and remedies recounted here. I hope the reader will be able to 
imagine a time when it was. 
2 Smith, supra note 1, at 14. 
3 Id. at 14–15. 
4 See generally Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP’s Postwar 
Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948–1964, 26 Law & Hist. Rev. 327 (2008). 
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achieve equal employment. As a result, they claimed that regula-
tors must demand—and regulated firms must establish—
affirmative action policies that required anything from recruiting 
and training underrepresented workers to achieving statistically 
proportional hiring at all job levels by race, sex, and ethnicity. 
Other officials rejected such a broad and affirmative version of 
equal protection. 
Administrators’ fundamental differences about the meaning and 
scope of equal protection led the FCC to adopt rules requiring that 
the broadcasters and common carriers it oversaw implement equal 
employment policies, while administrators at the Federal Power 
Commission (“FPC”) considered and rejected similar rules. This 
Article compares the history of equal employment rulemaking at 
the FCC and the FPC to examine how federal officials in a range of 
administrative offices, including executive departments, independ-
ent agencies, and executive committees, adopted or rejected a 
broad and affirmative understanding of equal protection. 
Smith’s speech, as well as administrators’ many statements fa-
voring or opposing equal employment rulemaking, demonstrates 
an unexamined aspect of constitutional governance and adminis-
trative lawmaking that I call administrative constitutionalism: regu-
latory agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitu-
tional law. This Article focuses primarily on the relationship 
between administrative and court constitutionalism. For the most 
part, administrative constitutionalism involves what I term creative 
interpretation. Administrators creatively extended or narrowed 
court doctrine in the absence of clear, judicially defined rules. They 
also directly interpreted the Constitution and relied on administra-
tive sources of constitutional authority that were alien to court 
constitutionalism. At times, however, administrators practiced 
what I call selective interpretation: in the presence of directly rele-
vant, but unfavorable, Supreme Court precedent, they ignored the 
unfavorable decisions. Finally, this history also includes administra-
tors practicing what I term resistant interpretation: faced with ap-
pellate-level judicial review of their policies, administrators acqui-
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esced in a court’s judgment, but did not embrace the constitutional 
principle underlying that judgment.5 
This Article emphasizes the relationship between administrative 
and court constitutionalism; nonetheless, it also attends to the rela-
tionship between the executive and legislative branches on the one 
hand, and administrators’ interpretation and implementation of the 
Constitution on the other. This history suggests that administrative 
constitutionalism cannot be reduced to an instance of legislative or 
executive constitutionalism. Instead, separation of powers and the 
resulting fractured oversight of administration, as well as admini-
stration’s sheer scope, created opportunities for administrators to 
act with some independence from Congress and the President.6 The 
5 Cf. William N, Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes, pt. 1 at 3, 
ch. 1 at 10–13, 54, 65 (forthcoming 2010). Eskridge and Ferejohn use the term “ad-
ministrative constitutionalism” to refer to the process by which legislators, executives, 
and administrators work out “America’s fundamental normative commitments,” a 
process that “include[s] but [is] not limited to Constitutional analysis.” See also 
Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 480, 485 (forthcoming 2010) (using the term “administrative constitu-
tionalism” to refer to judges using administrative law to require that administrative 
agencies consider constitutional concerns when designing or implementing policy). 
6 Agencies’ independence from both the President and Congress is hotly contested. 
Debates about presidential control tend to center on control over the removal of 
agency heads, agency litigation, and regulatory action. See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi 
& Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington 
to Bush (2008) (arguing that departmentalist constitutional theory supports a unitary 
executive who retains the right to remove agency heads at will, notwithstanding statu-
tory language to the contrary); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor 
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 255, 260–61, 
264 (1994) (noting the wide variation in agencies’ authority to represent themselves 
before the lower courts and arguing that, even before the Supreme Court, there are 
circumstances under which agency lawyers, rather than the Solicitor General, should 
be authorized to litigate on the agency’s behalf); Elena Kagan, Presidential Admini-
stration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2253 (2001) (arguing for the further elaboration of 
presidential control over agencies’ regulatory activities). As a practical matter, how-
ever, much of the day-to-day operation of agencies occurs free from presidential di-
rection. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Adminis-
trative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 47, 47–52 (2006) (finding weak empirical support for presidential control of 
agencies); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Adminis-
trative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704–05 (2007) (arguing that regulatory action 
proceeds, and should remain, independent of presidential direction). Likewise, em-
pirical studies find Congress to have limited, but hardly comprehensive, control of 
agencies. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889, 967–71 (2008) (find-
ing that transitions in the partisan control of Congress have some influence on agency 
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opportunities may have been contingent, partial, and constrained; 
indeed, there are many examples of executive and legislative influ-
ence in the form of both nudges and threats. The opportunities for 
independent action were nonetheless real: some of administrators’ 
most significant actions occurred despite, not because of, presiden-
tial or congressional action. This Article revisits a forgotten period 
of administrative constitutionalism, analyzing administrators’ in-
terpretive modes, how they embedded their constitutional inter-
pretations in administrative policy, and the relationship of adminis-
trative constitutionalism to the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches.7 
Administration grew explosively in the mid-twentieth century.8 
Yet currently, neither constitutional nor administrative law schol-
arship examines the constitutional interpretations of administrative 
agencies.9 This Article uses the history of equal employment rule-
making to provide what is, as far as I know, the first effort to 
document and analyze administrators’ constitutional practices. It 
action); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Admin-
istrative Agencies, 28 J. Legal Stud. 413, 445–46 (1999) (finding some effective con-
gressional use of agency design to control agency decisionmaking but finding that 
control limited). 
7 Some officials discussed herein interpreted the law for other administrative offices, 
some advocated within government, and still others implemented laws. All three 
types of officials—interpreters, advocates, and implementers—administered equal 
protection in ways that creatively extended, diverged from, and even directly dis-
agreed with court doctrine. This Article, which outlines the general phenomenon of 
administrative constitutionalism and recovers the particular constitutional doctrines 
embraced during this episode of it, emphasizes these regulators’ common participa-
tion in this form of constitutional governance. Future work could productively ex-
plore differences in the administrative constitutionalism regulators produce, for in-
stance by administrative function (for example, interpreters versus advocates) or 
institutional location (for example, executive departments versus independent agen-
cies). 
8 State, local, and federal governments regulated economic actors long before the 
New Deal. See Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National 
Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (2009); William J. Novak, The People’s 
Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (1996); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to 
Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 Yale L.J. 1568, 1628–33 (2008). The New Deal, however, 
marked a sea change in the scope and depth of economic regulation. 
9 Cf. Reuel E. Schiller, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law 
and Administration in Postwar America, 26 Law & Hist. Rev. 415, 422–23 (2008) 
(noting that administrators’ role as constitutional actors is little-studied by legal histo-
rians). 
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traces administrators’ interpretation of several aspects of equal 
protection—primarily the state action doctrine, affirmative equal-
ity rights,10 and affirmative action—to show how they advanced 
constitutional policies that imaginatively extended or retracted, in-
creasingly diverged from, and even contradicted courts’ constitu-
tional doctrine.11 
This history supports several conclusions. First, in the late twen-
tieth century equal protection followed a notably different path in 
administrative agencies than it did in the courts. Second, this lost 
episode of equal protection history suggests some general features 
of administrators’ constitutional practice, particularly that adminis-
trators are guided, but not always bound, by court doctrine. Third, 
administrative constitutionalism is likely a recurring aspect of the 
modern American state.12 To the extent that administrative consti-
10 In general, negative rights entitle the right-holder to be free from certain forms of 
government interference. In contrast, affirmative (or positive) rights entitle the right-
holder to a good or service. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 
1363, 1392–94 (1984). In practice, the line between affirmative and negative rights can 
blur. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 
2271, 2278–308 (1990) (arguing that the affirmative/negative distinction is neither a 
coherent nor useful distinction because the precepts underlying it are too indetermi-
nate and imprecisely descriptive); see also infra notes 369–74 and accompanying text. 
11 This Article also expands scholarship on administrators’ central role in developing 
civil rights policy during the 1960s and 1970s by demonstrating that the Constitution 
was a source for these policies. See, e.g., Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: 
Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972 (1990); John D. Skrentny, 
The Minority Rights Revolution (2002). For earlier instances of administrative civil 
rights, see Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law, 
and the Railroad Revolution, 1865–1920, at 344 (2001); Anthony S. Chen, “The Hitle-
rian Rule of Quotas”: Racial Conservatism and the Politics of Fair Employment Leg-
islation in New York State, 1941–1945, 92 J. Am. Hist. 1238 (2006); Timothy M. 
Thurber, Racial Liberalism, Affirmative Action, and the Troubled History of the 
President’s Committee on Government Contracts, 18 J. Pol’y Hist. 446 (2006). 
12 Early examples ripe for further exploration include the Freedmen’s Bureau, which 
implemented its understanding of such constitutionally resonant concepts as “free la-
bor” and “equal rights.” See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial In-
terpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice, and Civil Rights, 1866–1876, 
at 31–32, 200–01 nn.23–24 (1985) (describing briefly how Freedmen’s Bureau officials 
enforced “equal protection of the laws” as well as the First Amendment); Amy Dru 
Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the 
Age of Slave Emancipation 35–39 (1998) (discussing how Freedmen’s Bureau officials 
created, rather than merely implemented, the meaning of free labor). Administrative 
constitutionalism has involved subjects other than civil rights. See Reuel E. Schiller, 
Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern 
First Amendment, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3–4, 101 (2000) (examining how judicial defer-
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tutionalism differs from court constitutionalism, a complete ac-
count of the substance and scope of constitutional governance must 
consider the constitutional practice of administrative agencies. 
Moreover, this Article provides a case study about specific agen-
cies at particular moments in time. As a result, it opens a number 
of areas for future research. Most notably, it invites further investi-
gation of administrative constitutionalism’s prevalence, legality, 
desirability, and theoretical basis. 
Part I situates this history in administrative and constitutional 
law scholarship. The remaining Parts narrate the origins and fate of 
equal employment rulemaking and analyze the administrative con-
stitutionalism that shaped it. Part II explores how, during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, administrators at the FCC and the FPC creatively 
expanded or narrowed Supreme Court doctrine to arrive at inter-
pretations of state action that had yet to be adopted by the legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial branches. By 1972, the FCC had issued 
and dramatically enforced rules requiring the companies it regu-
lated to implement equal employment, while the FPC had rejected 
a similar equal employment policy. Part III explains how, during 
the 1970s, the Supreme Court repudiated the broad state action 
theories informing the FCC’s equal employment rules. Nonethe-
less, those theories persisted, as the FCC’s Associate General 
Counsel selectively ignored unfavorable Supreme Court decisions. 
Part IV brings administrative constitutionalism and equal em-
ployment rulemaking to the present day. Administrative support-
ers of equal employment rules had long argued that their affirma-
tive action policies implemented equal protection. During the 
1980s and 1990s the Supreme Court repeatedly held that equal pro-
tection constrained rather than compelled affirmative action pro-
grams. Nonetheless, the FCC maintained the view that its equal 
employment rules implemented the Constitution—even after the 
D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s broadcaster rules as a viola-
ence to agency interpretation of statutes gives agencies a de facto role in determining 
the scope of First Amendment protections); cf. Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before 
the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
553, 568 (2007) (describing how Congress and the Post Office developed communica-
tions privacy based on nonconstitutional principles, a policy the Supreme Court later 
incorporated into its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). In addition, adminis-
trative constitutionalism is not only a historical phenomenon. See infra Section III.B. 
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tion, not a vindication, of equal protection. The Conclusion offers 
an empirical sketch of administrative constitutionalism and consid-
ers its implications for future scholarship and practice. 
I. SITUATING ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
That the Constitution influences administrative action is hardly a 
novel or remarkable observation, but the Constitution is familiar as 
a constraint on administration, most prominently through judicial 
review of administrative action.13 In addition, administrative law 
scholars and courts recognize that agencies often need to design 
and implement policy with an eye to the Constitution.14 Yet most 
scholars debate what level of review courts should give administra-
tors’ constitutional interpretations,15 and how conservative agencies 
13 Canonical instances include Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), which held 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments limit state officials’ ability to terminate 
some employment contracts, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which found a Fourth Amendment cause of action 
against federal agents, and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which ruled that 
due process requires that welfare agencies not terminate recipients without first pro-
viding them with a hearing. For an illuminating account of state judges’ post-World 
War II development of constitutional checks on administration, see William E. Nel-
son, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York, 1920–1980, 
at 240–68 (2001). 
14 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A 
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 
507–08 (2005) (noting the multiple ways administrative actors must take the Constitu-
tion into consideration, including providing due process and conforming with search 
and seizure restrictions); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Consti-
tution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 113–14 (1993) (noting that administrators are often 
called on to implement the Constitution). 
15 Compare, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1092, 1180–81, 1184 (2008) (arguing that 
courts should not defer to agencies if their statutory interpretations raise serious con-
stitutional problems), and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power 
to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2608–10 (2006) (accord), with Kenneth A. 
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 
Yale L.J. 64 (2008) (arguing that courts should review agencies’ compliance with con-
stitutional norms with the same deference they do agencies’ interpretation of stat-
utes). To the extent that agencies’ policies raise serious constitutional questions, 
courts generally will not defer to them. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–74 (2001) (holding that where an administrative 
interpretation of a statute raises significant constitutional questions Congress did not 
expressly intend for the statute to raise, the court is not required to defer to the inter-
pretation); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that 
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should be when calibrating their actions to the courts’ constitu-
tional doctrines.16 These scholars have not examined how agencies 
actually go about interpreting and implementing the Constitution, 
or how administrators’ interpretations affect what it means to be 
governed by the Constitution. 
Constitutional law scholars, for their part, have shown a vigorous 
interest in non-court actors’ roles in making constitutional law. 
This literature, however, has not addressed the interpretations of 
the most pervasive aspect of government: administrative agencies. 
Scholarship on extra-court constitutionalism has followed along 
two sometimes overlapping but nonetheless analytically distinct 
tracks: popular constitutionalism and departmentalism.17 The popu-
lar constitutionalism literature generally examines how non-court 
actors (including social movements, Congress, and the President) 
interpret the Constitution in ways that diverge from the courts and 
how these divergent interpretations filter through democratic insti-
tutions and eventually affect judicial doctrine.18 From these descrip-
courts should deny an agency action Chevron deference if, on skeptical review, it 
raises “serious” constitutional concerns). But cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811–12 (2009) (declining to “apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-
capricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional liberties”). 
16 Compare Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2608–10 (arguing that administrators should 
interpret their powers conservatively unless expressly directed by Congress to do oth-
erwise), with Mashaw, supra note 14, at 508–09 (contending that agencies should not 
avoid constitutional questions), Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the 
Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189 (2006) (arguing that in some circum-
stances executive branch officers should not employ the avoidance canon even if a 
court would), and H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the Avoidance Canon, 81 
Ind. L.J. 1313 (2006) (arguing against the executive branch, including administrative 
agencies, interpreting statutes so as to avoid constitutional problems). 
17 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Ju-
dicial Supremacy, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1027, 1031–32 (2004) (distinguishing between popu-
lar constitutionalist and departmentalist claims, but noting that they can, at times, 
overlap). But see Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial In-
terpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
105, 111 (2004) (describing popular constitutionalism as a strain of departmentalism). 
18 Because of this emphasis on elective government as a filter for popular constitu-
tional norms, this literature, while it studies Congress and the President, is best under-
stood as popular constitutionalism. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1805–12 (2007) (arguing that the interaction of judicial and 
democratic processes can produce fundamental changes in the Constitution itself, not 
merely in Supreme Court doctrine). The popular constitutionalism literature is exten-
sive. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has In-
fluenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (2009) 
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tive accounts, some scholars posit a normative claim: that these fil-
tering processes enhance the democratic legitimacy and robustness 
of courts’ constitutional holdings.19 
The departmentalism literature also focuses on the interpretive 
authority of non-court actors, most prominently Congress and the 
President, and often emphasizes the interplay among all three 
branches. However, unlike popular constitutionalists, who empha-
size the impact of interbranch dialogue on courts, departmentalists 
focus on the coordinate interpretive authority of Congress and the 
President, including spheres in which the political branches have 
nonreviewable interpretive independence.20 Also in contrast to 
popular constitutionalists, departmentalists’ arguments generally 
(though not exclusively) proceed from the Constitution’s structural 
provisions rather than positive constitutional theory.21 But neither 
(contending that the Supreme Court harmonizes its opinions with popular views over 
time); Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Ju-
dicial Review (2004) (arguing that initially the people and their elected representa-
tives, not the courts, had final interpretive authority, and positing that the later turn 
toward judicial supremacy has been bad for democracy and constitutional law); Keith 
E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional 
Meaning (1999) (arguing that constitutional law emerges from a conversation among 
political actors that is permeable to popular and democratic forces); Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan En-
trenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 489, 533–35 
(2006) (updating their theory of partisan entrenchment through which electoral poli-
tics and judicial appointments shape doctrine); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 374 
(2007) (arguing that “the authority of the Constitution depends on its democratic le-
gitimacy,” which is forged from popular contest over constitutional meaning and 
elected officials who “resist and respond to these citizen claims”). 
19 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in 
History and Politics 6 (2002) (arguing that recognizing constitutional law as “histori-
cally conditioned and politically shaped” gives it “integrity and coherence”); Post & 
Siegel, supra note 18, at 374–79. 
20 Again, this literature is quite extensive and dates back to the early days of the re-
public. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 6, at 23; see, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, 
The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. 347, 
348 (1994) (arguing for a moderate theory of departmentalism based on institutional 
competency); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994) (contending that, within the 
spheres of the President’s governing powers, her authority cannot be bound by the 
other branches). Johnsen, supra note 17, has a useful discussion of this literature at 
116–18. 
21 Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 1032. As Post and Siegel point out, Larry Kramer 
is an example of a popular constitutionalist who also embraces strong departmenta-
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the departmentalists nor the popular constitutionalists have studied 
administrators’ constitutional interpretations. 
To the extent that either administrative or constitutional law 
scholarship addresses administrators’ constitutional practices, it 
provokes important questions about how administrators interpret 
the Constitution but does not yet provide answers. For instance, 
administrative law scholars who have recognized that administra-
tors must interpret the Constitution in their day-to-day work have 
not studied these practices or their relationship to court-based con-
stitutionalism.22 Also, while several extra-court constitutionalism 
scholars have looked at executive branch interpretations, they have 
focused exclusively on the work of the President’s closest legal ad-
visors, including the Solicitor General, the Attorney General, and 
the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”).23 The constitutionalism they 
lism. Id. at 1031; see also Kramer, supra note 18, at 109. Likewise, departmentalists 
who emphasize interbranch dialogue and rely on history share much in common with 
popular constitutionalists. See, e.g., Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 6, at 22–29. 
22 Reuel Schiller demonstrates that when agencies’ animating statutes use constitu-
tionally significant terms, courts’ deferential review can give agencies a de facto role 
in determining the scope of these constitutional categories. Schiller, supra note 12, at 
4–5; Schiller, supra note 9, at 422. His work opens the question of how agencies make 
use of this deference. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586–95 
(1983), which allowed the IRS to take equal protection values into consideration in 
meeting its statutory duty, also invites work on how agencies actually use the Consti-
tution. Strauss, supra note 14, at 115, surmises that most government attorneys apply 
an “is it defensible” approach to deciding whether administrative action comports 
with the Constitution, and suggests some principles that should guide their constitu-
tional interpretations. His work is intriguing, but it is not based on empirical analysis. 
Mashaw, supra note 14, at 507–09, recognizes that there is little empirical evidence of 
agencies’ interpretive practices. His work importantly begins to develop evidence of 
agencies’ statutory, but not constitutional, interpretation. Cf. Metzger, supra note 5, at 
497 (arguing that courts should use administrative law to “foster[] a more affirmative 
and independent agency role in implementing constitutional requirements”); Ernest 
A. Young, The Constitution Outside of the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 411–12 
(2007) (arguing that most important constitutional questions are resolved not by 
courts applying constitutional text, but by a range of government actors, including 
administrators, considering subconstitutional norms). 
23 Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional 
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 Ind. L.J. 363, 383–90 
(2003) (demonstrating how President Reagan’s Attorney General and Office of Legal 
Policy promulgated constitutional interpretations deeply at odds with Supreme Court 
precedent, but focusing on how these interpretations expanded presidential power 
and were used to affect judicial doctrine); Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676 (2005) (study-
ing the interpretive practices of the OLC and Solicitor General); H. Jefferson Powell, 
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have documented is that of the President, not administrators. Thus, 
legal scholars, while providing rich empirical examples of social 
movement, as well as congressional and presidential constitutional 
interpretation, and gesturing at the constitutional practice of regu-
latory bodies, have not yet examined ordinary administrators as 
constitutional actors.  
This Article draws on the extra-court constitutionalism and ad-
ministrative law literatures, particularly their emphasis on how 
non-court actors interpret and implement the Constitution in ways 
that differ from courts, their interest in positive constitutional the-
ory,24 and their recognition of administrators’ ineluctable constitu-
tional role. At the same time, it takes these literatures in new direc-
tions by analyzing administrators’ constitutional practice. To fully 
understand constitutional governance we must examine the Consti-
tution’s unexplored life in administrative agencies. 
II. CREATIVE INTERPRETATION 
In the absence of clearly defined judicial standards, during the 
1960s and early 1970s, FCC officials and other administrators crea-
tively expanded the Supreme Court’s state action doctrine in order 
to justify, adopt, and enforce equal employment rules. During that 
same period, the FPC creatively narrowed the Court’s state action 
doctrine to reject equal employment policies. These administrators 
also made creative use of authorities, directly interpreting the Con-
The President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 
67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 530 (1999) (basing his analysis in part on OLC and Attor-
ney General opinions, with the exception of two State Department documents). But 
see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 10–13, 44–45 (providing a welcome, if brief, 
look at how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission considered equal pro-
tection, among other factors, in designing pregnancy discrimination policy). For my 
previous exploration of administrators’ constitutional interpretations, see Lee, supra 
note 4. 
24 On the value of positive constitutional theory, see Jack M. Balkin, What Brown 
Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1537, 1576 (2004), and 
Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Ju-
dicial Review, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257 (2004). On the particular need for empirically 
grounded theories of executive branch (and by extension administrative) constitu-
tionalism, see Pillard, supra note 23, at 679–80. 
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stitution and relying on executive and administrative constitutional 
interpretations.25 
A. The FCC Implements Equal Employment Rules 
In the early 1960s, agency lawyers adopted broad theories of 
state action, arguing that the Constitution authorized, and perhaps 
even compelled, agencies and the businesses they regulated to 
adopt equal employment policies. During the 1960s, these lawyers’ 
creatively expansive state action theories spread throughout ad-
ministration, spurring the FCC to adopt and enforce equal em-
ployment rules governing the broadcasters and common carriers 
that the Agency oversaw. 
1. FCC Attorneys Creatively Expand State Action 
Administrative constitutionalism flourished in the early 1960s, 
encouraged by President Kennedy. Upon taking office, Kennedy 
used his executive authority to order administrators to implement 
civil rights and improve their own civil rights records.26 In doing so, 
he frequently asserted that the Constitution demanded no less. For 
instance, his executive order barring discrimination in federal em-
ployment and in work conducted under federal contracts declared 
such discrimination “contrary to the Constitutional principles and 
25 That these administrators creatively expanded or narrowed Supreme Court doc-
trine is unlikely to come as a surprise. Indeed, Strauss, supra note 14, at 133, surmises 
that administrators do not cleave cautiously to Supreme Court precedent when con-
sidering the constitutionality of their actions. Strauss suspects that administrators in-
stead feel constrained by judicial opinions only insofar as they adopt positions that 
they could credibly defend in court. Strauss’s account may not fully capture adminis-
trators’ creative interpretations: this history shows administrators espousing argu-
ments they have been advised a court would not likely adopt and relying on sources a 
court would not likely consider. Either way, this history suggests that in practice ad-
ministrators’ creative interpretations can yield unexpected and widely divergent re-
sults, making this seemingly unremarkable practice appear far more significant. 
Whether administrators’ creative interpretations are surprising in the abstract, they 
are essential to understanding administration’s effect on what it means to be governed 
by the Constitution. 
26 See Carl M. Brauer: John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction 67–75, 315–
16 (1977); see also Marvin Weisbord, Civil Rights on the New Frontier, Progressive, 
Jan. 1962, at 15. But see Nick Bryant, The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Strug-
gle for Black Equality (2006) (emphasizing Kennedy’s weak commitment to civil 
rights in the early years of his administration). 
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policies of the United States” and asserted that the government 
had a “plain and positive obligation” to ensure equal employment 
opportunity.27 Kennedy also invoked the Constitution in his 1962 
order barring discrimination in federally assisted housing and de-
scribed the order as “sound, public, constitutional policy.”28 Ken-
nedy’s executive orders suggested that government officials had an 
affirmative constitutional obligation to implement the Constitu-
tion’s equality guarantees. 
Kennedy’s legal advisors, however, questioned the wisdom of 
this approach. The White House requested a formal opinion from 
the OLC outlining the legal authority for the President’s equal em-
ployment order.29 At first the OLC hinted, as had the President’s 
order, that the government might have an affirmative constitu-
tional “duty” to ensure equal employment. According to the 
OLC’s draft opinion, the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases 
indicated that there was a “fundamental policy that the powers of 
the government shall not be used to promote or perpetuate dis-
crimination.”30 Even this elliptical suggestion, however, was ulti-
mately rejected. Ralph Spritzer, an attorney in the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s office, found the draft opinion’s suggestion that the 
government was constitutionally obligated to require nondiscrimi-
nation from its contractors “unnecessary and troublesome” as well 
27 Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).  
28 John F. Kennedy, Press Conference in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 20, 1962), avail-
able at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/ 
Press+Conferences/003POF05Pressconference45_11201962.htm [hereinafter Kennedy 
Press Conference]; see also Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 20, 
1962) (declaring discrimination in federally financed housing “unfair, unjust, and in-
consistent with the public policy of the United States as manifested in its Constitution 
and laws”). It is unclear whether Kennedy meant that the policy was constitutional 
because it implemented, or because it did not violate, the Constitution. The transcript 
of his oral comment inserts commas between the four words, emphasizing the latter 
meaning, but a transcription without the commas would emphasize the former. 
29 The OLC was the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) office tasked with providing 
legal advice to the executive and to administrative agencies. 
30 Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney Gen. 
(“AAG”), OLC, DOJ, to Mr. MacGuiness, AAG, Civil Division, DOJ 11 (Aug. 4, 
1961) (Department of Justice Records, National Archives and Records Administra-
tion at College Park, John F. Kennedy Library, micro-copy NK-2, roll 91, “Employ-
ment” [hereinafter DOJ micro-copy]) (enclosing draft opinion). 
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as “highly vulnerable.”31 OLC staff was also worried that the opin-
ion suggested “that the government is constitutionally bound to 
prohibit discrimination in all activities supported by federal 
funds.”32 When the opinion was issued in September 1961, its af-
firmative language had been all but eliminated,33 and the constitu-
tional basis for the order had been downplayed in favor of policy 
arguments about “effective use of the nation’s manpower re-
sources.”34 
The reticence of the President’s legal advisors did not extend to 
the administrators at the President’s Committee for Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity (“PCEEO”), who were tasked with imple-
menting the President’s order, or to their colleagues at the FCC. 
Instead, these administrators took seriously their affirmative obli-
gation to implement equal protection. In doing so, they creatively 
stretched Supreme Court doctrine. 
In 1963, FCC attorneys circulated to the PCEEO’s Special 
Counsel a memo arguing that the Constitution’s equal protection 
guarantees not only authorized but also required the FCC to deny 
licenses to broadcasters who discriminated in employment. The 
FCC attorneys offered both a statutory argument that turned on 
the Constitution and a direct constitutional argument that the FCC 
and its licensed broadcasters had to ensure nondiscrimination. The 
FCC attorneys first noted that the Communications Act required 
the FCC to license only broadcasters who would serve the “public 
interest, convenience and necessity.”35 In determining which broad-
casters would serve these purposes, the FCC attorneys reasoned 
that the Agency “ha[d] the authority and duty” to consider wheth-
er an applicant had violated the Fifth Amendment “and the public 
31 Memorandum from Ralph S. Spritzer, Assistant to the Solicitor Gen., to Nicholas 
deB. Katzenbach, AAG, OLC (Aug. 8, 1961) (DOJ micro-copy). 
32 Memorandum from James L. Morrisson to Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, AAG, 
OLC (Oct. 8, 1961 (file date)) (DOJ micro-copy). 
33 Opinion from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney Gen., to Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice 
President (Sept. 26, 1961) (DOJ micro-copy). The final opinion, unlike the draft, did 
not mention a “duty” not to discriminate. Id. at 11–12. 
34 Memorandum from James L. Morrisson to Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, supra note 
32. 
35 Memorandum from N. Thompson Powers, Special Counsel, PCEEO, to Norbert 
A. Schlei, AAG, OLC, DOJ 1 (July 8, 1963) [hereinafter Powers Memo] (DOJ micro-
copy) (enclosing FCC memo). 
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policies established thereunder.”36 This included “the policy of the 
United States Government against racial discrimination” as ex-
pressed, for instance, in President Kennedy’s housing discrimina-
tion executive order.37 Accordingly, the FCC attorneys concluded, 
the FCC should refuse to license broadcasters who practiced racial 
discrimination because licensing such broadcasters “would not be 
in the public interest.”38 
In addition to a statutory argument that turned on administra-
tors’ Fifth Amendment duties, the FCC attorneys argued that the 
Constitution directly compelled the FCC to deny licenses to ra-
cially discriminatory broadcasters. They reasoned further that 
broadcasters were also state actors constitutionally barred from 
discriminating. In doing so, the FCC attorneys adopted versions of 
the state action doctrine that had uncertain support in Supreme 
Court doctrine. 
During the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, the Supreme Court ex-
panded the reach of the state action doctrine, finding an increasing 
range of public involvement with traditionally private activity suffi-
cient to trigger constitutional rights.39 Most famously, Shelley v. 
Kraemer held that even where the discrimination itself was not 
state action, court enforcement of private discrimination (in this 
case a racially restrictive covenant) was unconstitutional.40 The 
FCC attorneys, in arguing that the Fifth Amendment “compelled 
[the FCC] to consider whether an applicant practices racial dis-
crimination,” reasoned from a different set of Supreme Court 
 
36 Id. (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases the Supreme Court determined that the Consti-
tution’s equality guarantees only constrained actions taken by the state and its agents. 
109 U.S. 3, 23–25 (1883). The decision struck down Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, which Congress had passed pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment powers. Section 1 prohibited discrimination against African Americans by the 
owners of public conveyances and accommodations. Id. at 19. By deeming these busi-
nesses’ decisions quintessentially private, the Supreme Court established that eco-
nomic decisions were outside the Fourteenth Amendment’s reach. For historical 
treatment, see Welke, supra note 11, at 336–43, and William E. Nelson, The Four-
teenth Amendment: From Principle to Judicial Doctrine 194–95 (1988). 
40 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1953) 
(holding that court awards of damages for the violation of a racially restrictive cove-
nant were state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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cases.41 The FCC attorneys first asserted that granting a license to 
an applicant who practiced racial discrimination “would be tanta-
mount to the sanctioning of the discriminatory practices.”42 Lacking 
any precedent that merely sanctioning (as opposed to Shelley-like 
enforcing) discrimination was unconstitutional, the FCC attorneys 
cited Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak as a somewhat analo-
gous case.43 Pollak stated, in what is arguably dicta, that a govern-
ment commission’s general regulation of streetcar companies, and 
its dismissal of an investigation into the streetcar company’s chal-
lenged policy, created “a sufficiently close relationship between” 
the government and the policy to consider the policy’s constitu-
tionality.44 In doing so, the FCC attorneys elided the arguably sig-
nificant difference between a government agency directly approv-
ing a challenged policy and failing to prohibit it or generally 
empowering the entity that adopted it. 
The FCC attorneys also argued that “the relationship between 
the FCC and its licensees” requires that the licensed broadcasters’ 
actions “be measured by the standards of the Constitution.”45 In 
support of the claim that broadcasters were state actors, the FCC 
attorneys noted a recent Supreme Court decision, Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority.46 Burton found that the particular rela-
tionship between a government agency and a privately owned res-
taurant to which it leased property rendered them “joint 
participant[s].”47 As a result, “the proscriptions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” the Burton Court ruled, “must be complied with by 
the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants writ-
41 Powers Memo, supra note 35, at 2.   
42 Id. This Article uses the term “sanctioning” as did the historical actors whose 
words it captures: to mean to “encourage by . . . implied approval.” Oxford English 
Dictionary 441 (2d ed. 1989). 
43 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Powers Memo, supra note 35, at 2. 
44 Powers Memo, supra note 35, at 2 (quoting Pollak, 343 U.S. at 462). The FCC at-
torneys misquoted Pollak, which used the term “relation” rather than “relationship.” 
Regardless of phrasing, the portion of Pollak on which the FCC attorneys relied was 
dicta, as the Court ultimately assumed state action was present and upheld the chal-
lenged policy on the grounds that even so, the policy would not violate the First or 
Fifth Amendments. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 462–65. 
45 Powers Memo, supra note 35, at 3. 
46 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
47 Id. at 725. 
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ten into the [restaurant’s lease] agreement itself.”48 The Burton 
Court also went out of its way to limit its opinion to the facts of the 
case, cautioning that “the conclusions drawn from the facts and cir-
cumstances of this record are by no means declared as universal 
truths on the basis of which every state leasing agreement is to be 
tested.”49 Instead, the Court held only that equal protection ad-
hered when a “[s]tate leases public property in the manner and for 
the purpose shown to have been the case here.”50 The FCC attor-
neys ignored Burton’s limiting language, baldly asserting that a 
broadcaster whose FCC license allowed it to use publicly owned 
airwaves was “equivalent to a ‘lessee’ of Government property.”51 
As such, the licensee, like the government, had to comply with the 
Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees. The FCC attor-
neys concluded by pointing out that the FCC could avoid these 
“serious constitutional questions” by interpreting the Communica-
tions Act’s public interest standard to prohibit discrimination by 
FCC licensees.52 
The PCEEO had grand ambitions for the FCC attorneys’ consti-
tutional theories, ambitions that vastly stretched these theories’ al-
ready tenuous connection to Supreme Court doctrine. The FCC at-
torneys’ reasoning creatively expanded Supreme Court doctrine 
either by ignoring the Court’s limiting language or by relying on 
loosely relevant precedent. The FCC attorneys’ arguments were 
strongest when made, as they were, about broadcasters. The FCC 
had a uniquely close relationship to broadcasters, not only author-
48 Id. at 726. 
49 Id. at 725. 
50 Id. at 726. Burton contained language, and cited lower court opinions holding, that 
government actors had an affirmative duty to ensure that those with whom they par-
ticipated afforded equal protection. See infra note 70. Interestingly, the FCC attor-
neys did not rely on these precedents when arguing that the FCC must consider the 
employment practices of its regulated industries. 
51 Powers Memo, supra note 35, at 3. The FCC attorneys did not discuss lower court 
precedent. The most relevant case they could have cited would probably have been 
Betts v. Easley. 169 P.2d 831 (Kan. 1946) (finding unions certified by a federal labor 
board to be state actors); cf. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 
1963) (finding that, under Burton, private hospitals that received significant public 
funds and were part of a “joint or intermeshing state and federal . . . program[]” were 
state actors); Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding private 
entities to be state actors when they perform a public function). 
52 Powers Memo, supra note 35, at 3.  
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izing their use of public airwaves at regular intervals, but also pro-
viding ongoing regulation of broadcast content to ensure that it 
met community needs and standards, much like the Public Utilities 
Commission in Pollak. However, the PCEEO wanted to use the 
FCC memo to support a broad plan to “ask all regulatory agencies 
to consider whether they have power to require that the companies 
they regulate follow a policy of non-discrimination in employ-
ment.”53 Other regulated businesses, like the phone companies 
regulated by the FCC and the gas and electric utilities regulated by 
the FPC, experienced less substantive and ongoing government 
oversight. As a result, whatever the merits of the FCC attorneys’ 
state action arguments with respect to broadcasters, they were ar-
guably much weaker with respect to telephone and power compa-
nies. 
If the PCEEO was eager to stretch the FCC attorneys’ broad 
state action theories even further, these theories received a much 
cooler reception from executive branch lawyers, Supreme Court 
justices, and members of Congress. In anticipation of discussing the 
PCEEO’s plan for broad regulatory action, its Special Counsel 
asked the OLC for its view of the FCC attorneys’ state action theo-
ries. This was not an easy request to fulfill. Indicating the question-
able doctrinal support for the FCC memo, the head of OLC, Nor-
bert Schlei, responded that the memo raised “difficult and far-
reaching questions.”54 “Conceivably, the conclusion which it 
reaches is correct,” Schlei conceded, but determining as much 
would take some time.55 
Even as Schlei sent off his cautious and lukewarm response, 
events far from Washington embroiled the Supreme Court, Con-
gress, and the President’s closest legal advisors in a searching de-
bate over the state action theories on which the FCC attorneys re-
lied. Sit-in protests were spreading throughout the South, 
inundating state and federal courts with constitutional challenges 
to the protesters’ arrests and spurring Congress into action. As a 
result, all three branches of government had to determine whether 
equal protection barred businesses from discriminating against Af-
53 Id.  
54 Memorandum from Norbert A. Schlei, AAG, OLC, to N. Thompson Powers, 
Special Counsel, PCEEO (circa July 8, 1963) (DOJ micro-copy). 
55 Id.  
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rican-American customers or cities from arresting and prosecuting 
those who protested their exclusion. All three branches enter-
tained, but either refused to adopt or outright rejected, licensing 
and sanctioning theories of state action similar to those advanced 
by the FCC attorneys. 
In the summer and fall of 1963, Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy testified before Congress about proposed civil rights leg-
islation that would prohibit discrimination in public accommoda-
tions like those targeted by the sit-in protests. Congress was con-
sidering grounding the law in its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection provisions. The bills under consid-
eration relied on a broad state action theory much like that ad-
vanced by the FCC attorneys: that the Fourteenth Amendment 
reached any business operating under state or local authorization, 
permission, or license. Attorney General Kennedy urged Congress 
to reject this approach. The licensing theory of state action, Ken-
nedy cautioned, took Congress “to the full limits of the constitu-
tional power contained in the 14th amendment.”56 Echoing Schlei’s 
response to the PCEEO, the Attorney General warned that ex-
panding state action in this way would raise “very far-reaching and 
grave issues.”57 Even if the Supreme Court might ultimately en-
dorse a licensing theory of state action, Kennedy thought this ap-
proach unadvisable. “Passing and upholding a bill solely upon the 
licensing theory or some variation would have vast Constitutional 
implications,” he warned.58 Doing so would unwisely convert a 
range of traditionally private entities, including private schools and 
universities, charitable organizations, and licensed professionals, 
into state actors.59 
Kennedy expressed similar skepticism about whether, as the 
FCC attorneys had argued, government sanctioning of otherwise 
private discrimination triggered Fourteenth Amendment protec-
56 Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2656 
(1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney Gen. of the United States) [here-
inafter Kennedy House Statement]. 
57 Hearing on S. 1731 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 88th Cong. 5 (1963) (state-
ment of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney Gen. of the United States) (MGLI 13.2479, 
Howard A Glickstein Papers, University of Notre Dame Archives, Notre Dame, IN 
[hereinafter Glickstein Papers]). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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tions. One bill proposed that Congress prohibit discrimination that 
was “sanctioned” by the state under its Fourteenth Amendment 
powers.60 Kennedy testified that the term “sanction” could be mis-
leading because, in fact, the state would have to “take some overt 
action to bring about segregation” in order for the discrimination 
to fall within Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement au-
thority.61 When asked if mere sanctioning would be enough state 
action, Kennedy replied, “I don’t think so.”62 In his congressional 
testimony, the Attorney General publicly cast serious doubt, even 
outright rejected, the broad state action theories formulated by the 
FCC attorneys and considered by the PCEEO. 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court followed the Attorney 
General’s lead. When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
the next summer, it excluded both the licensing and sanctioning 
state action theories. Instead, the law defined businesses whose 
discrimination or segregation “is supported by State action” to in-
clude only discrimination required by the state, taken under color 
of law, or taken under color of an officially enforced custom.63 The 
actions of licensed broadcasters would not fall within this congres-
sionally defined ambit. 
The Supreme Court, for its part, dodged these “far-reaching” 
constitutional questions, but it was clear that the Justices were bit-
terly split over the fate of the state action doctrine. Decided days 
before the Civil Rights Act was signed into law, Bell v. Maryland 
involved a constitutional challenge to Maryland’s conviction of 
civil rights sit-in protesters.64 The Justices, after much agonizing, 
decided the case on nonconstitutional grounds. Nevertheless, the 
concurring and dissenting opinions indicated that Chief Justice 
Warren and Justices Douglas and Goldberg were prepared to find 
that the convictions amounted to unconstitutional state enforce-
ment of discrimination, while Justices Black, Harlan, and White 
were strongly opposed to expanding Shelley’s enforcement theory 
of state action to include the protestors’ convictions.65 In addition 
60 Kennedy House Statement, supra note 56, at 2698–700. 
61 Id. at 2699. 
62 Id. 
63 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), (d) (2006). 
64 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
65 Id. at 242, 286, 318. 
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to narrowly defining what constitutes state enforcement, the dis-
senters also rejected the FCC attorneys’ licensing theory of state 
action, cautioning, “to hold that a State must be held to have par-
ticipated in prejudicial conduct of its licensees is too big a jump for 
us to take.”66 
Over the next few years, the Court inched its way towards a 
more expansive state action jurisprudence. The Court indicated 
that Burton should not be read narrowly to apply only to public 
leases, clarifying that whenever there was significant involvement 
between the state and an otherwise private entity, or an entity’s 
discriminatory acts, there was sufficient state action to trigger 
Fourteenth Amendment protections.67 In Reitman v. Mulkey, the 
Court also held that not only state enforcement, but also mere ac-
tive encouragement, of private discrimination was unconstitu-
tional.68 These decisions led one hopeful court watcher to predict 
that the “radical changes in society . . . even now are tolling the 
demise of state action.”69 By the mid-1960s, however, the FCC at-
torneys’ “far-reaching” licensing and sanctioning theories of state 
action had been rejected by the Attorney General, passed over by 
Congress, and had yet to be accepted by the Supreme Court. 
Administrators did not abandon the FCC attorneys’ broad state 
action theories, despite their cool reception in the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial branches. Instead, administrators continued to 
embrace their affirmative duty to implement the Constitution.70 At 
66 Id. at 333. 
67 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794–95 n.7 (1966) (stating that Burton 
and Pollak stood for the principle that state action existed anytime a state had so in-
sinuated itself with a private actor as to have become a joint participant); Evans v. 
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1966) (holding that a privately deeded but publicly 
managed and funded park had become so imbricated with the state that it would be 
unconstitutional to revert it in order to restore it to the segregated use the testator 
had required). 
68 387 U.S. 369, 380–81 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional an amendment to the 
California State Constitution that annulled a state law banning discrimination in hous-
ing because it “significantly encourage[d] and involve[d] the State in private discrimi-
nations”). 
69 John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the 
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 855, 855 (1966). 
70 The idea that administrators are affirmatively obligated to implement the Consti-
tution proved less controversial than the FCC attorneys’ state action theories. Alex-
ander Bickel lauded Kennedy’s promise to commit his administration “to ‘equal pro-
tection’ as a rule of independent, self-starting political and administrative action, 
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the same time, the indeterminacy of the Court’s multifactored state 
action doctrine and the other branches’ reticence about resolving 
the far-reaching issues the FCC attorneys had raised left adminis-
trators leeway to extend the state action doctrine without directly 
contradicting the Court, Congress, or the President. With the gov-
ernment under pressure to do more to address discrimination by 
federally regulated industries from trucking to television, the 
PCEEO’s and FCC’s idea of taking regulatory action against em-
ployment discrimination remained attractive. 
2. The FCC Adopts Equal Employment Rules 
From 1967 to 1970, the idea that administrators should affirma-
tively implement their understanding of the Constitution’s equal 
protection commands spread. When the FCC proposed and 
adopted equal employment rules, the Agency heard from a variety 
of administrators that equal protection demanded no less. In justi-
fying their position, these administrators imaginatively extended 
court doctrine, drew on administrative and executive authorities, 
and offered their own interpretations of the Constitution. 
During the 1960s, public administration underwent a revolution 
in form. Traditionally regulating via adjudication, by the late 1960s, 
administrators increasingly used rulemaking instead.71 When gov-
erning by adjudication, agencies, like courts, responded to the case 
at hand. Rulemaking, in contrast, provided administrators with a 
means to make broad, proactive, and prospective policy.72 Agencies 
rather than merely as an obligation to uphold the courts.” Alexander Bickel, The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 38 Comment. 33, 33 (1964). Burton also implied that a city 
agency had an affirmative obligation to ensure that its lessee did not discriminate. See 
supra note 50. Charles Black thought the Court was verging on holding that the Con-
stitution required those within its state action orbit to take affirmative steps to end 
racial discrimination. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protec-
tion, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 97–98 (1967). 
71 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the 
U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the 
Administrative State, in Administrative Law Stories 334, 339–42 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 
2006); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Cul-
ture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1140 (2001). 
72 Thanks to Alan Schoenfeld for emphasizing this distinction. See also Graham, su-
pra note 11, at 465–66 (describing the rise of rulemaking as part of a “wholesale 
rather than retail” and “more legislative than adjudicatory” approach to administra-
tion). 
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had long been criticized for being captured by the industries they 
regulated. Rulemaking, with its open petition process and public 
comment requirements, unlocked businesses’ hold on regulators 
and created avenues for new constituencies to assert themselves. 
Generally thought to be more fair and efficient, rulemaking was 
soon all the rage. 
In April 1967, the United Church of Christ (“United Church”) 
took advantage of this opening and petitioned the FCC for equal 
employment rules. United Church’s petition advanced a version of 
the FCC attorneys’ statutory argument for FCC action, albeit one 
that did not invoke a broad national policy against discrimination 
or link that policy to the Constitution. Employment discrimination 
was not in the public interest, as evidenced by a federal statute and 
an executive order, United Church argued.73 Any broadcaster who 
discriminated in employment was not meeting the Communica-
tions Act’s public interest requirement.74 Accordingly, United 
Church asked the FCC to require all licensed broadcasters to af-
firmatively demonstrate that they did not discriminate in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.75 
No sooner had United Church submitted its petition than the 
FCC began receiving pressure from other government officials, a 
broad array of liberal organizations, and the media. Over the next 
several months, statements of interest and support poured in from 
congressmen, unions, civil rights advocates, civil libertarians, and 
even from President Johnson.76 Then, in January 1968, a number of 
73 Petition from Orrin G. Judd & Earle K. Moore, Goldstein, Judd & Gurfein, 
Counsel, Office of Communication, Board for Homeland Ministries, and Committee 
for Racial Justice Now of the United Church of Christ, to FCC, Docket No. 18244 ¶¶ 
1–2 (Apr. 21, 1967) (Hearing Docket Files, FCC, Record Group 173, National Ar-
chives, FRC Box 2, Folder 1 [hereinafter FCC Docket 18244]). 
74 Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
75 Id. ¶ 4. 
76 See, e.g., Letter from Alan Reitman, Associate Dir., American Civil Liberties Un-
ion (“ACLU”), to Hon. Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, FCC (July 31, 1967) (FCC Docket 
18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1); Statement from Esteban E. Torres, Secretary-
Treasurer, Washington Council of the League of United Latin-American Citizens, to 
FCC (June 15, 1967) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1); Statement from 
Leonard Lesser, General Counsel, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, to FCC 
(June 13, 1967) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1); Memorandum from Hon. 
Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senate, to Congressional Liaison Office, FCC (Apr. 26, 
1967) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1); see also Letter from Rev. Everett 
C. Parker, Dir., Office of Commc’n, United Church of Christ, to President Lyndon B. 
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prominent articles in periodicals like TV Guide and the New York 
Times detailed the prevalence and effects of employment discrimi-
nation in the broadcast industry.77 The petitioners gathered these 
stories and started mobilizing congressional support again, this 
time calling for legislation requiring the FCC to act.78 By April, 
United Church had succeeded. The proposed bill, H.R. 16586, 
would have amended the Communications Act to prohibit dis-
crimination in employment by broadcast licensees. Significantly, 
unlike Title VII, which required complainants to prove an em-
ployer had discriminated, H.R. 16586 would put the burden on 
broadcasters to affirmatively prove that they did not discriminate.79 
All who wrote the FCC during this period offered versions of the 
public interest statutory argument without linking the public inter-
est to the Constitution.80 However, the Constitution crept back into 
the conversation, first implicitly and then explicitly. Robert L. 
Carter, the NAACP’s General Counsel, did not cite the Constitu-
tion outright.81 Nonetheless, Carter’s statement relied on adminis-
trators’ constitutional interpretations, hinted at a version of the 
FCC attorneys’ sanctioning theory of state action, and described 
administrators as having affirmative constitutional obligations. 
Carter had led the NAACP’s constitutional advocacy before ad-
Johnson  (June 7, 1967) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1) (using margin 
strikes to highlight the President’s “strong endorsement” of the proposed rule).  
77 See, e.g., Art Peters, What the Negro Wants from TV, TV Guide, Jan. 20, 1968, 
(FCC Docket No. 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1); Douglas Robinson, New Media 
Charged With Giving False Image of Minorities, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1968, at 28, 
(FCC Docket No. 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1). 
78 See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Charles E. Cobb, Executive Coordinator, Comm. for 
Racial Justice Now, to Sen. Clifford P. Case (Feb. 9, 1968) (FCC Docket No. 18244, 
FRC Box 2, Folder 1). 
79 H.R. 16586, 90th Cong. (1968). This bill probably did not put much pressure on 
the FCC, as it most likely was never considered by the House committee to which it 
was referred. Letter from Rep. Samuel N. Friedel to Hon. Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, 
FCC 2 (Aug. 23, 1968) (FCC Docket No. 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1) [hereinafter 
Friedel Letter]. 
80 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. John Conyers, Jr., to Hon. Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, 
FCC, (July 13, 1967) (FCC Docket No. 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1) (“The airways 
are a public utility and they are leased to station managers to be used in the interest of 
the public. It is therefore incumbent upon the licensees to adopt the policies and prac-
tices of the federal government in employment.”). 
81 Statement from Robert L. Carter & Barbara A. Morris, Counsel for the NAACP, 
to FCC (June 9, 1967) (Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress Manuscript Divi-
sion (“LCMD”), Part V, Box 315, Folder 15 [hereinafter NAACP Papers]). 
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ministrative agencies in the 1950s and early 1960s.82 In 1964, Carter 
won a path-breaking decision before the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”), Hughes Tool Co.83 Unlike the Attorney Gen-
eral, Congress, and the Supreme Court, which had all recently re-
jected or dodged the FCC’s licensing and sanctioning theories of 
state action, the NLRB embraced them. According to the NLRB, 
under the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees, it could 
not “countenance[]” (synonymous with sanction) or certify (akin to 
license) unions with racially discriminatory membership and bar-
gaining practices.84 Although the NLRB cited Supreme Court 
precedent to support its finding, the NLRB, like the FCC attor-
neys, creatively stretched those opinions “to the full limits . . . of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,” where none of the three branches of 
government had yet gone.85 Carter now directed the FCC’s atten-
tion to Hughes Tool, emphasizing that “[o]ther federal agencies 
have felt compelled to insulate and protect federal machinery from 
supporting, protecting or condoning racial discrimination practiced 
by parties or groups that seek the right, privilege and protection 
which use of the federal machinery affords.”86 The FCC, Carter 
urged, should do the same. 
The FCC’s constitutional obligations were first explicitly argued 
not by a veteran movement lawyer, however, but by a government 
official exposed to the administrative constitutionalism of the Ken-
nedy administration. The FCC’s General Counsel asked the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division for its view of the FCC’s au-
thority to issue United Church’s proposed rule. In May 1968, 
Stephen J. Pollak, the head of the Civil Rights Division, responded 
to the FCC’s request.87 Pollak had begun his government service in 
the Solicitor General’s office during the Kennedy years, and had 
since held various general counsel posts in President Johnson’s 
82 See generally Lee, supra note 4. 
83 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574 (1964); see Lee, supra note 4, at 329–30. See generally 
Michael R. Botson, Jr., Labor, Civil Rights, and the Hughes Tool Company (2005). 
84 Hughes Tool, 147 N.L.R.B. at 1574, 1577. 
85 Kennedy House Statement, supra note 56, at 2656. 
86 Statement from Robert L. Carter & Barbara A. Morris, supra note 81. 
87 Letter from Stephen J. Pollak, AAG, Civil Rights Division (“CRD”), to Hon. 
Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, FCC (May 21, 1968), in Nondiscrimination in Employment 
Practices of Broadcast Licensees, App. A, 33 Fed. Reg. 9960, 9964–65 (July 11, 1968) 
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter Pollak Letter]. 
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administration before taking charge of the Civil Rights Division 
earlier that year.88 Whether Pollak had seen the FCC lawyers’ 
memo during his years in government is unclear; in any case, he 
now made a version of that argument back to the FCC. 
Pollak advised that the FCC had ample statutory and constitu-
tional authority to adopt equal employment rules if it so chose. 
Like the FCC attorneys, Pollak identified a national policy against 
employment discrimination and advised the FCC that it could find 
that broadcasters who violated that policy failed to advance the 
public interest. Like other letter writers, Pollak did not connect this 
national policy to the Constitution. Unlike the other letter writers, 
however, Pollak added an explicitly constitutional argument akin 
to that advanced by the FCC attorneys before him. 
Pollak, like his predecessors in the OLC and the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s office, avoided stating that administrators had an affirmative 
constitutional obligation to demand equal employment from the 
businesses they regulated. Where his predecessors shied away from 
“far-reaching” state action theories, however, Pollak endorsed 
them. Echoing the FCC attorneys’ licensing theory of state action, 
Pollak argued that broadcasters’ use of the public airwaves gave 
them “enough of a ‘public’ character” that the FCC could “require 
the licensee to follow the constitutionally grounded obligation not 
to discriminate on the grounds of race, color, or national origin.”89 
In advancing this expansive state action theory, Pollak employed 
two of administrative constitutionalists’ standard tools: extrapolat-
ing broad readings of Supreme Court precedents to novel adminis-
trative contexts and relying on administrators’ constitutional inter-
pretations. Pollak recognized that there were “no cases directly in 
point” to support his constitutional advice.90 Instead, like the FCC 
attorneys before him, Pollak stretched Burton to reach the case at 
hand. Pollak likened broadcasters’ use of public airwaves to the 
restaurant’s use of a public building in Burton. Constitutional obli-
gations inhered in a federal agency’s license, Pollak suggested, just 
as they did in the restaurant’s lease. 
88 See A Conversation with Stephen J. Pollak, Bar Report, Dec./Jan. 2000, 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/legends_in_the_law/pollak.cfm.  
89 Pollak Letter, supra note 87, at 9964. 
90 Id. 
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Pollak’s letter also drew on a source of authority foreign to 
court-made constitutional law: other agencies’ actions. Pollak 
noted that other “agencies have been permitted or required to 
prohibit racial discrimination by those they license or certify.”91 
Among the examples he cited was the NLRB’s Hughes Tool deci-
sion.92 As Pollak’s letter demonstrates, administrative constitution-
alists readily ventured into constitutional territory unexamined by 
the courts. When doing so, they did not cleave cautiously to Su-
preme Court precedent. Instead, they viewed court doctrine more 
as a license than a constraint and relied on fellow administrators’ 
constitutional interpretations. 
Given Pollak’s advice and the FCC attorneys’ earlier memo, 
there was reason to expect bold FCC action. Then again, in the 
past, the FCC’s Commissioners had proven themselves less eager 
than its attorneys to impose civil rights obligations on broadcasters. 
Around the time the FCC attorneys floated their 1963 memo, 
United Church sought to block the license of a southern television 
station that it accused of programming bias.93 At the time, the FCC 
was chaired by Emil Henry, a southern racial progressive known as 
a champion of civil rights.94 Nonetheless, the Commissioners re-
jected United Church’s challenge. If anything, the prospects for 
bold action by the Commissioners had grown dimmer since. After 
Henry resigned in 1967, President Johnson appointed Rosel Hyde 
to chair the FCC. Hyde had worked for the FCC since the 1920s 
and had served as a Commissioner since the 1940s.95 He was a Re-
publican who preferred minimal government regulation and was 
generally considered the broadcasters’ ally.96 Hyde was expected to 
rein in the FCC after a period of turmoil.97 To FCC-watchers, 
Hyde’s appointment as chair “signaled the end of the New Frontier 
era.”98 Of course, President Johnson had also appointed Nicholas 
Johnson. A Democrat, Johnson had already earned a reputation as 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 For a history of the challenge, see Kay Mills, Changing Channels: The Civil Rights 
Case that Transformed Television (2004).  
94 Gerald V. Flannery, Commissioners of the FCC 1927–1994, at 129–31 (1995). 
95 Id. at 75–76. 
96 Id. at 76–77. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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a brash young reformer and a friend of public interest groups.99 
This outspoken neophyte might offer civil rights groups a voice on 
the Commission, but he was unlikely to outweigh Hyde, a longtime 
insider. 
In July 1968, the FCC issued its order and proposed rulemak-
ing.100 The FCC advised that the Justice Department’s views had 
been especially influential, but where Pollak had advised the FCC 
that it could adopt equal employment policies, the FCC announced 
that it was compelled to do so. The FCC did not mention the Con-
stitution outright. However, its reasoning resembled that in the 
FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo. The FCC recognized a “national pol-
icy against discrimination in employment.”101 This policy was “em-
bodied in section VII of the Civil Rights Act” but was not limited 
to Title VII’s provisions.102 Indeed, “even where no violation of a 
specific [antidiscrimination] statute is established or alleged,” the 
FCC reasoned, “allegations may raise serious public interest is-
sues.”103 This was because a federal license was subject to the same 
limits as a federal contract, limits that were independent of Title 
VII.104 The FCC did not say from where these limits derived, but 
the FCC attorneys had argued in their 1963 memo that these limits 
arose out of government’s equal protection obligations.105 The FCC 
concluded that it could not find a broadcaster who violated this 
broad national policy to be operating in the public interest.106 
The FCC offered another more tentative reason that its equal 
employment authority could extend beyond technical violations of 
the existing antidiscrimination laws. A licensed broadcaster, the 
FCC noted, was a public trustee obligated to “ascertain the needs 
and interests of his public.”107 Broadcasters who discriminated in 
their employment might cut themselves off from the communities 
99 Id. at 147–48. 
100 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. 
9960 (July 11, 1968) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
101 Id. ¶ 4. 
102 Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. 
103 Id. ¶ 8. 
104 Id. 
105 Powers Memo, supra note 35. 
106 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. 
¶ 9. 
107 Id. ¶ 10. 
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from which they refused to hire employees, “rais[ing] a question of 
whether the licensee is making a good faith effort to serve his en-
tire public.”108 Thus, the FCC linked broadcasters’ employment 
practices with their service provision. 
If the FCC’s reasoning could be expected to please the petition-
ers, its proposed rule did not. United Church’s proffered rule re-
quired broadcasters to provide statistical proof that they did not 
discriminate. In contrast, the FCC stated that its existing policies 
already empowered it to entertain individual complaints of dis-
crimination, a process that would place the burden of proof on 
workers, not employers.109 Furthermore, the FCC stated that the 
racial proportionality of a broadcaster’s workforce alone could not 
prove discrimination.110 The only new rule the FCC proposed was a 
modest one requiring all broadcasters to post nondiscrimination 
notices in the workplace and on their employment applications.111 
Instead, the FCC made a plea to broadcasters’ consciences, asking 
that they follow not just the letter of the FCC’s policy, but its spirit 
as well, by inspiring and recruiting black men and women to be-
come journalists.112 
The rule’s proponents were dissatisfied, to say the least. Mem-
bers of Congress, government officials, civil rights and labor or-
ganizations, and church groups all wrote to the FCC.113 Pollak’s let-
ter seemed to have set off an administrative and constitutional 
firestorm. One after another, comments arrived at the FCC, argu-
ing that the FCC and its licensees were constitutionally compelled 
to enforce equal employment.114 Again, the most developed consti-
108 Id. ¶ 11. 
109 Id. ¶¶ 13–16. These differences encapsulated a larger debate about what, pre-
cisely, constituted “discrimination,” hiring disparities or employer motive, and 
whether it was a systemic problem needing broad remedies or an individual injury re-
quiring case-by-case resolution. 
110 Id. ¶ 14. 
111 Id. ¶ 17. 
112 See id. ¶ 21. 
113 See, e.g., Friedel Letter, supra note 79, at 1–2; Letter from Clifford L. Alexander, 
Jr., Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), to Rosel H. 
Hyde, Chairman, FCC 1 (Aug. 20, 1968) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1). 
114 See, e.g., Comment from Earle K. Moore & Edward A. Bernstein, Counsel for 
Petitioners, to FCC 3–4 (Oct. 7, 1968) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1); 
Comment from Robert L. Carter, Gen. Counsel, NAACP, to FCC 3 (Sept. 6, 1968) 
(FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1). 
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tutional case was made not by a public interest litigator, but by 
Howard Glickstein, the Staff Director of the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights (“Civil Rights Commission”). In writing to 
the FCC, Glickstein was fulfilling his Commission’s role as a civil 
rights advocate and watchdog within the federal government.115 
Like Pollak, Glickstein had been immersed in the civil rights con-
stitutional theories of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
During the early 1960s, while serving in the Justice Department’s 
Civil Rights Division, Glickstein had considered the FCC attor-
neys’ memo as well as the PCEEO’s plan for broad regulatory ac-
tion.116 Since then he had served as the Civil Rights Commission’s 
General Counsel and then Staff Director. Glickstein’s letter to the 
FCC built on the broad state action and affirmative rights claims he 
had absorbed during his years in the Civil Rights Division. 
Glickstein, like the FCC attorneys before him, made both a di-
rect constitutional argument and a statutory argument grounded in 
the Constitution. Indeed, the Constitution was so central to Glick-
stein’s letter that he included a separate appendix containing an ex-
tended discussion of the FCC’s constitutional obligations, as well as 
those of the broadcasters the FCC regulated. Glickstein elaborated 
on the connection the FCC’s order had drawn between the hiring 
and service provision, and linked this statutory requirement to the 
Constitution. According to Glickstein, the FCC had a statutory 
duty, backed by a “Constitutional requirement[], to ensure that the 
programming of licensees serves the needs of all portions of the 
community.”117 Because broadcasters’ hiring affected their pro-
gramming, the FCC had a statutorily imposed, but constitutionally 
derived, duty to require that “each licensee . . . take every action 
that is necessary to ensure” that its employees “reflect the popula-
tion of the community it serves.”118 Like the FCC’s order, Glick-
stein emphasized that this duty was far broader than Title VII’s 
nondiscrimination mandate.119 
115 Letter from Howard A. Glickstein, Acting Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil 
Rights, to Hon. Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, FCC A-2–A-5 (Sept. 9, 1968) (FCC 
Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 1) [hereinafter Glickstein Letter]. 
116 Powers Memo, supra note 35. 
117 Glickstein Letter, supra note 115, at 3. 
118 Id. at 4. 
119 Id. 
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Glickstein also argued that FCC-licensed broadcasters were 
state actors, directly bound by the Constitution’s equal protection 
guarantees to ensure equal employment. In doing so, his citation of 
case law was thin and his readings were bold and broad. Citing 
Burton, Glickstein mainly relied on the “significant involvement” 
argument the Supreme Court seemed most comfortable with,120 but 
he broadened it considerably. Where the Court had demanded sig-
nificant involvement, Glickstein argued that the “Constitutional 
requirements of nondiscrimination . . . extend to all private action 
that has a substantial tinge of governmental involvement.”121 
Glickstein next propounded an astonishingly broad metric to de-
termine whether private action had a “substantial tinge” of gov-
ernment involvement. He argued that, under Burton, government 
involvement should be measured by the extent of the “contacts be-
tween the governmental unit and private act of discrimination, or 
between the governmental unit and the private actor.”122 There was 
nothing inherently sweeping in this sufficiency-of-contacts ration-
ale. What gave the rationale its startling breadth were the “two 
primary contacts” Glickstein said would be “sufficient to render 
the Constitutional right to be free from discrimination applicable 
to private conduct.”123 Glickstein argued that under Burton, state 
action inhered anywhere a private entity served a public interest, 
and a government body had the power to regulate its conduct.124 
Glickstein cited cases, but he was not cautiously implementing 
courts’ constitutionalism. Instead, Glickstein’s version of state ac-
tion was at least as expansive as the licensing and sanctioning theo-
ries that the Court had thus far refused to adopt. Lawyerly admin-
istrators like Glickstein and Pollak might invoke case law, but they 
treated it as persuasive yet flexible support rather than as con-
straining authority. 
Finally, Glickstein argued that the FCC was directly bound by 
the Constitution to ensure that its licensees implemented equal 
120 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
121 Glickstein Letter, supra note 115, at A-2 (emphasis added). Glickstein also cited 
City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1963), described supra note 51. 
Glickstein Letter, supra note 115, at A-3. 
122 Id. at A-2. 
123 Id. at A-4. 
124 Id. 
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employment. According to Glickstein, the FCC was under a 
“strong[] duty to enforce the Constitutional requirement” of non-
discrimination.125 Echoing the FCC attorneys’ sanctioning theory of 
state action, Glickstein argued that by failing to do so, the FCC 
“would be participating in [its licensees’] unconstitutional con-
duct.”126 Glickstein did not rely on a broad reading of Supreme 
Court precedent to reach this conclusion. In fact, he did not cite 
any authority at all. Instead, Glickstein appeared to be directly in-
terpreting the Constitution. Taken as a whole, Glickstein’s com-
ment envisioned administrative agencies and broadcasters equally 
obligated by the Constitution to ensure equal employment. 
Other administrators ignored the Supreme Court altogether, re-
lying exclusively on administrative interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (“OFCC”), the 
successor of the PCEEO, enforced the employment nondiscrimina-
tion clauses in all government contracts. This was the agency to 
which the FCC had likened its own equal employment duty and 
that implemented the “national policy against discrimination in 
employment” that the FCC now sought to enforce.127 Ward 
McCreedy, the OFCC’s Acting Director, sent the FCC a letter re-
minding the FCC of the constitutional basis for both its duty and 
that national policy.128 McCreedy did not cite courts for constitu-
tional authority, relying instead on how equal protection governed 
his office’s policies. 
McCreedy had been enforcing the government’s nondiscrimina-
tion contract clauses since the Kennedy years.129 During the 1960s, 
his office justified its actions by relying on the government’s af-
firmative equal protection duties.130 In 1963, attorneys from 
125 Id. at A-7. 
126 Id. at 2. 
127 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. 
9960, 9961 ¶ 4 (July 11, 1968) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
128 Letter from Ward McCreedy, Acting Dir., Office of Fed. Contract Compliance, 
Dep’t of Labor, to Hon. Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, FCC 1 (Nov. 12, 1968) (FCC 
Docket No. 18244, FRC Box 2, Folder 2) [hereinafter McCreedy Letter]. 
129 See Catherine Harris, Recollections of John Rayburn, EEOC Employee, 1965–
1984 (Dec. 10, 1999), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/voices/oral_history-
john_rayburn-catherine_harris.wpd.html. 
130 See Graham, supra note 11, at 330–31 (describing a Department of Labor brief 
that defended OFCC’s affirmative action policy on the grounds that it fulfilled the 
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McCreedy’s office had considered the FCC attorneys’ memo as a 
template for arguing that the Constitution required equal employ-
ment in regulated industries.131 Offering a nondoctrinal blend of the 
FCC attorneys’ licensing and sanctioning theories of state action, 
and echoing administrators’ understanding of their affirmative con-
stitutional obligations, McCreedy reminded the FCC that his office 
had “long concurred with the view that the licensing powers of 
Federal agencies should be employed . . . against discrimination in 
employment.”132 McCreedy likened a government license to a gov-
ernment contract: according to McCreedy, “consistent with the 
constitutional principle underlying the Government’s refusal to 
deal with contractors engaging in discriminatory employment,” the 
government also could not license businesses that discriminated in 
employment.133 Furthermore, he suggested that these were affirma-
tive, not merely negative, constitutional commands. McCreedy re-
ported that his office emphasized to employers that “passive non-
discrimination does not fulfill the requirements of Federal law.”134 
Demonstrating how administrative constitutionalism’s modes of 
reasoning and argument differed from those of the courts, 
McCreedy did not advance his constitutional view in doctrinal 
terms. Instead, he relied directly on the Constitution and on his 
administrative office’s interpretations of that document. 
McCreedy’s letter coincided with Richard Nixon’s narrow vic-
tory over Democrat Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential 
elections. Nixon’s subtle race-baiting during his campaign sug-
gested that he would not encourage administrators to continue to 
implement equal protection independently or to pursue civil rights 
aggressively.135 Nonetheless, in June 1969, the FCC issued its order 
on the proposed rulemaking.136 The FCC ignored its prior sugges-
President’s equal protection obligations). See generally supra notes 26–53 and accom-
panying text. 
131 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
132 McCreedy Letter, supra note 128, at 1. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 2. 
135 Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New 
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics 326–70 (1995) (tracing 
the racial resonance of Nixon’s “law and order” campaign). 
136 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, Report and Order, 34 Fed. Reg. 
9284 (June 6, 1969). 
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tion that rules were justified because broadcasters’ employment 
practices might impact their service provision, as well as Glick-
stein’s constitutional argument to the same effect. Instead, the FCC 
used the strategy its attorneys had ultimately recommended in the 
early 1960s: interpreting the Communications Act so as to avoid 
the constitutional problems that would arise if the FCC failed to 
demand, and its licensees to implement, equal employment.137 The 
FCC recognized that it had received comments relying on cases 
like Burton, that made a “substantial case . . . [that] the Commis-
sion,” as a result of its relationship to broadcasters, “ha[d] a consti-
tutional duty to assure equal employment opportunity.”138 But the 
FCC found that it “need not decide this point” because of its “in-
dependent responsibility to effectuate [the] strong national policy” 
demanding equal employment opportunity.139 
The Constitution shaped the FCC’s statutory interpretation both 
explicitly and implicitly. The FCC’s constitutional avoidance rea-
soning relied on the expansive state action theories and affirmative 
understanding of administrators’ equal protection duties that had 
been percolating through government agencies since the early 
1960s. Read in conjunction with the FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo, it 
suggests that for the FCC, equal protection turned a statutory can 
into a constitutional must. The Constitution also worked its way 
less explicitly into the FCC’s rule. The FCC found itself statutorily 
obligated to ensure broadcasters did not harm the public interest 
by violating the national policy against discrimination. As the FCC 
attorneys’ 1963 memo and McCreedy’s recent letter made clear, 
this national policy derived from the Fifth Amendment. Thus the 
FCC, as its attorneys had recommended in 1963, avoided directly 
violating the Constitution by fulfilling what the FCC saw as its 
statutory duty to ensure that the broadcasters it regulated did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment “and the public policies established 
thereunder.”140 
The equal employment rule’s scope also appeared to be shaped 
by the affirmative and sweeping constitutional theories that had 
137 Powers Memo, supra note 35. 
138 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, Report and Order, 34 Fed. Reg. at 
9284. 
139 Id. 
140 Powers Memo, supra note 35. 
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poured into the FCC over the previous months. Reversing its ear-
lier position, the FCC rejected the individual complaint approach, 
instead requiring all broadcasters to “establish, maintain, and carry 
out, a positive continuing program of specific practices designed to 
assure equal opportunity in every aspect of station employment 
policy and practice.”141 In addition, the FCC required broadcasters 
to submit annual data on the race and ethnicity of their employees. 
Quoting a federal circuit court, the order reasoned, “In the prob-
lem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much.”142 Mirroring 
Glickstein’s and McCreedy’s constitutional advocacy and advice, 
the FCC defined discrimination as a systemic, not individual, prob-
lem that affirmatively required employers to ensure its elimination. 
Over the next few months, Nixon appointed two Republicans to 
the FCC, including a new chair who, as a former campaign man-
ager for Barry Goldwater, had championed the free market, de-
nounced regulatory overreaching, and faced accusations of racism 
during his Senate confirmation process.143 One might expect that 
Nixon’s personnel choices would derail the FCC’s civil rights poli-
cymaking, but they did not. Despite the change in leadership and 
committee makeup, in December 1969, the FCC announced an-
other equal employment rulemaking, this time for the common 
carriers—telephone and telegraph companies—that it licensed and 
regulated. The proposed rule was essentially the same as the one 
that it had adopted for broadcasters: each carrier would be re-
141 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, Report and Order, 34 Fed. Reg. at 
9286. 
142 Id. at 9285 (quoting Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
The quote referred to the use of statistics in voting registration and jury composition 
cases. The FCC also requested comments on what forms it should use to satisfy its 
new rule’s reporting requirements. Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 Fed. Reg. 9288 (June 12, 1969) (to be codi-
fied at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 1). During this period, a National Organization for Women 
(“NOW”) chapter requested that the FCC add sex to its nondiscrimination policy. 
Letter from Cindy Judd Hill, Pub. Relations Dir., Greater Pittsburgh Area Chapter of 
NOW, to Ben F. Waple, Sec’y, FCC (Sept. 25, 1969) (FCC Docket 18244, FRC Box 2, 
Folder 2). The following summer when the FCC announced its new rule, it did so. 
Non-Discrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, Report and 
Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 8825, 8825, 8827 (June 6, 1970) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 
73). 
143 Flannery, supra note 94, at 145, 154–55. Dean Burch became Chair October 31, 
1969. Id. His predecessor, Rosel Hyde, was also not a movement activist. See supra 
notes 95–98 and accompanying text. Robert Wells was sworn in on November 6, 1969. 
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quired to “carry out . . . a positive continuing program of specific 
practices designed to assure equal opportunity,” provide annual 
employment statistics, and give information on its nondiscrimina-
tion program whenever it applied for a license, license renewal, or 
construction permit.144 In addition, the FCC would consider indi-
vidual complaints of discrimination. 
As with broadcasters, the FCC asserted that it was compelled to 
implement a broad national policy against discrimination that tran-
scended “the specific provisions of the Civil Rights Act.”145 The 
FCC noted that many common carriers operated radio facilities, 
which brought them under the Communications Act’s public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity requirements.146 If these common 
carriers violated the national policy against discrimination, the 
FCC would have to deny them radio authorizations for failing to 
serve the public interest. The FCC acknowledged that there were 
“differences . . . in the public interest considerations” governing 
common carriers and broadcasters, but nonetheless concluded 
without explanation that “these differences do not affect the 
Commission’s responsibility to take what steps it can to eliminate 
discrimination by common carriers.”147 
The FCC also relied on a service provision rationale. The 
Agency reasoned that common carriers, by virtue of being granted 
a monopoly, had “a unique and peculiar public interest role” that 
barred them from discriminating in service provision.148 Borrowing 
from their recent order proposing equal employment rules for 
broadcasters, the FCC linked carriers’ hiring practices with their 
service. According to the FCC, “a company which follows dis-
criminatory employment practices would find it difficult to provide 
144 Communications Common Carriers, Non-Discrimination in Employment Prac-
tices, 34 Fed. Reg. 19200, 19200–01 (Dec. 4, 1969) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 1, 
21, 23). 
145 Id. at 19200. 
146 Id. at 19200–01. 
147 Id. There were also potentially significant differences between the two industries 
in terms of a state action analysis. For instance, the FCC’s regulatory relationship with 
broadcasters was more involved than its relationship with common carriers. As a re-
sult, the argument that the FCC’s regulatees were state actors under a significant-
involvement theory of state action was weaker for common carriers than for broad-
casters. 
148 Id. at 19201. 
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nondiscriminatory service.”149 The FCC did not attempt to explain 
this connection. Instead, it simply asserted that there was one. 
Once again, the FCC did not explicitly cite the Constitution, but 
its justification for the proposed rule had undertones of constitu-
tional compulsion. The FCC concluded that “because of the special 
position granted communications common carriers by the Gov-
ernment, and the relationship between service to the public and the 
carrier’s employment practices, it would be intolerable to counte-
nance discriminatory employment practices.”150 By using language 
that echoed the sanctioning theory of state action relied on in the 
FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo and the NLRB’s Hughes Tool order of-
ten cited to the FCC over the last two years, the FCC suggested 
that equal protection informed its proposed policies. 
In August 1970, the FCC issued almost the exact rule it had pro-
posed less than a year before.151 There was, however, one notable 
addition. In its proposed rules, the FCC set out a system of report-
ing and individual complaints, which would be primarily forwarded 
to federal, state, and local employment discrimination agencies. In 
its adopted rule, however, the FCC said it would also investigate a 
new kind of complaint: one “indicating a general pattern of disre-
gard of equal employment practices.”152 The FCC did not say much 
more about the legal authority for its new rule, primarily incorpo-
rating its prior statements. The Agency did emphasize once again 
that it had an “independent responsibility to effectuate the strong 
national policy against discrimination in employment,” a national 
policy that had its roots in the Constitution.153 To the extent that 
the FCC’s new rule was influenced by the Constitution, this admin-
istrative implementation of equal protection would target hiring 
disparities, not only intent, and would vindicate group, not only in-
dividual, rights. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Non-Discrimination in Employment Practices of Communications Common Car-
riers, Report and Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 12892, 12894 (Aug. 14, 1970) (to be codified at 
47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 1).  
152 Id. at 12895. 
153 Id. at 12893. 
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3. The FCC Enforces Its Equal Employment Rules 
In the fall of 1970, the FCC had its new rules put to the test. 
AT&T requested a rate increase, which set off a storm of opposi-
tion from consumer groups.154 If this sort of response was expected, 
one party’s petition was not.155 In an unprecedented move, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) sought to 
intervene on the grounds that AT&T discriminated in its employ-
ment practices.156 According to the EEOC, “Overwhelming statisti-
cal evidence indicates that AT&T’s operating companies have his-
torically excluded and segregated and continue to exclude and 
segregate women, blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans.”157 
These statistics, the EEOC argued, were prima facie evidence that 
AT&T discriminated in violation of the Communications Act and 
the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the EEOC alleged that the 
FCC would violate this Act and the Fifth Amendment if it allowed 
the AT&T rate increase.158 In addition to promoting a statistical 
and systemic definition of discrimination rather than an individual 
complaint- and intention-driven one, the EEOC joined the growing 
list of administrators enforcing broad state action and govern-
ment’s affirmative constitutional duties. 
Lower courts were beginning to catch up with the administrative 
constitutionalists, giving the EEOC a more robust range of cases to 
cite. The EEOC referenced the same Supreme Court decisions as 
had the previous proponents of agencies’ equal employment re-
sponsibilities. In addition, the EEOC bolstered its arguments with 
recent lower court decisions adopting the broad licensing and sanc-
tioning theories of state action on which administrators had been 
154 See Petitions Opposing Proposed AT&T System Increased Tariff Schedules and 
for Other Relief (Jan. 6, 1971) (Docket 19129, Hearing Docket Files, FCC, Record 
Group 173, National Archives, FRC Box 1, Binder 1). 
155 See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption 
in Postwar America 357 (2003) (dating 1967 to 1973 as the peak years of the consumer 
rights movement). 
156 Marjorie A. Stockford, The Bellwomen: The Story of the Landmark AT&T Sex 
Discrimination Case 19 (2004) (noting that the EEOC staff found no precedent for its 
inter-agency intervention). 
157 Memorandum in Support of EEOC Petition to Intervene from Stanley P. Hebert, 
General Counsel, & David A. Copus, Attorney, EEOC, to FCC 1 (Dec. 10, 1970) 
(EEOC v. AT&T, NAACP Papers, Part V, Box 353, Folder 1 [hereinafter EEOC v. 
AT&T Papers]). 
158 Id. at 2. 
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relying.159 The EEOC extended the logic of these precedents to 
reach AT&T’s hiring practices. Like the FCC’s common carrier 
rules, the EEOC’s broad state action reasoning emphasized the 
government’s grant of monopoly status, rather than a license, to 
common carriers. The EEOC argued that, since “AT&T has grown 
to be the world’s largest utility because of federal government suf-
ferance,” it “is subject to the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”160 Adopting a version of the sanctioning state action 
theory laid out in the FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo, the EEOC also 
argued that the FCC’s “[a]pproval of the rate increase would im-
pliedly authorize the [AT&T] discrimination to continue”; this, the 
EEOC asserted, “clearly contravenes the [C]onstitution.”161 In ad-
dition to this broad state action reasoning, the EEOC used Burton 
and subsequent lower court cases to support the proposition that 
government entities must take “affirmative steps to insure that 
those with whom they participate do not engage in practices which 
violate the [C]onstitution.”162 Under this theory, agencies and their 
regulatees—in this case, the nation’s largest corporation—were 
constitutionally required to end discrimination nationwide. 
The EEOC crafted its constitutional argument by citing more 
cases and drawing more precise analogies to them than prior ad-
ministrators had. This legalism may have reflected the Agency 
lawyers’ general orientation towards court litigation, the new con-
text of a court-like adjudication, or the simple fact that these ad-
ministrative constitutionalists had a growing number of cases to 
draw on. At the same time, too much should not be made of the 
EEOC’s relatively legalistic approach; its petition still embodied 
administrative constitutionalists’ innovative and flexible use of 
court doctrine. The recent decisions the EEOC cited were mainly 
district and state court cases, hardly controlling authority for fed-
eral agencies. In addition, although the Supreme Court had yet to 
159 Id. at 33–34 (citing Burton, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Sim-
kins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 964 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc); 
Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1970); James v. Ogilvie, 310 F. Supp. 
661 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Seidenberg v. McSorleys’ Old Ale House, 308 F.Supp. 1253 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967)). 
160 Id. at 35. 
161 Id. at 47. 
162 Id. (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 725; Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1963); 
Ethridge, 268 F. Supp. at 87). 
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strike down an instance of sex discrimination and courts still 
deemed sex a reasonable basis for different treatment, the EEOC 
in no way sought to separate its claim that AT&T discriminated on 
the basis of sex from the rest of its constitutional argument.163 At a 
time when women were demonstrating for their constitutional 
rights in the streets, politicians were planning legislative action to 
advance women’s rights, and legal strategists were seeking sex dis-
crimination test cases to bring in the courts, the EEOC petition put 
the Agency’s constitutionalism and its AT&T action decidedly in 
the legal forefront.164 Thus, even though the EEOC’s petition relied 
more extensively on courts’ decisions, its administrative constitu-
tionalism creatively extended Supreme Court doctrine. 
David Copus hatched the idea for this novel intervention. He 
was a recent hire at the EEOC, indicating that administrative con-
stitutionalists’ creatively broad state action theories were not sim-
ply held over from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Co-
pus proposed the action to the EEOC’s Chairman, William H. 
Brown, III, a Republican who had spent the first dozen years of his 
career as a top litigator at a successful all-black law firm in Phila-
delphia.165 Brown had ties to the Johnson administration, initially 
serving as an interim appointee to the EEOC during Johnson’s last 
months. Brown also had the endorsement of President Nixon, who 
made him Chair in 1969. He replaced Democrat Clifford Alexan-
der, who resigned amid Republican accusations that he was too 
tough on business; many assumed Brown was hand-picked to in-
163 The Supreme Court first considered the status of sex discrimination under its 
post-Brown equal protection doctrine in the fall of 1971. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 
72–73, 77 (1971) (striking down a state law giving preference to males for appoint-
ment as administrators of a deceased’s estate). 
164 On the popular constitutional claims the women’s movement had made at their 
August 1970 Women’s Strike for Equality, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Leg-
islative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 1988–93 (2003). For a history of 
the feminist movement’s constitutional strategy, see Serena Mayeri, Constitutional 
Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 755 
(2004). 
165 Aaron Porter, Norris, Schmidt, Green, Harris, Higginbotham & Associates: The 
Sociological Import of Philadelphia Cause Lawyers, in Cause Lawyering: Political 
Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 151–52 (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold eds., 1998).  
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stead go easy on employers.166 That may be what Brown was hand-
picked for, but it is not what he delivered. 
Brown was intrigued by Copus’s AT&T proposal, but cautious. 
The EEOC was a small, overburdened, and struggling agency 
known for its relative powerlessness. Taking on the nation’s largest 
corporation would be risky. Nonetheless, Brown assigned Copus a 
pair of junior lawyers to see what kind of case they could make. 
Like Copus, his young colleagues took to the broad state action 
and affirmative rights constitutionalism percolating through the 
federal bureaucracy, adding to it their passion for women’s rights. 
The EEOC petition was the fruit of their collective labors.167 
In January 1971, civil rights groups’ petitions to intervene and in 
support of the EEOC’s request streamed in to the FCC. Their fil-
ings incorporated the EEOC’s petition and claimed that the FCC 
would violate the Communications Act and the Fifth Amendment 
if it approved AT&T’s rate increase.168 The FCC soon severed the 
EEOC-initiated action from the AT&T rate hearing, stating that it 
would instead consider the EEOC petition under the FCC’s newly 
minted equal employment rules.169 
At first, the EEOC’s petition had garnered only modest atten-
tion from the press, but once the FCC indicated that it would take 
action, newspapers took notice. “FCC Checking AT&T for Bias,” 
read the front page of the Washington Post.170 “It was the first time 
166 The Nixon Look: Regulatory Agencies Take Pro-Business Cast with New Nomi-
nees, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1969, at 1, 16; see also Robert Young, Brown Sworn in 
Rights Job; Named Chief, Chi. Trib., May 7, 1969, at A8. 
167 For a detailed account of the EEOC petition’s origins, see Stockford, supra note 
156, at 21–30. 
168 Petition from David Cashdan, Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Counsel for Cal. Rural 
Legal Assistance, & The Mex. Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund (“MALDEF”), to 
FCC (Jan. 18, 1971) (In the Matter of AT&T Transmittal No. 10989, NAACP Papers, 
Part V, Box 352, Folder 8); Petition from David Cashdan, Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, 
Counsel for ACLU, to FCC (Jan. 18, 1971) (In the Matter of AT&T Transmittal No. 
10989, NAACP Papers, Part V, Box 352, Folder 8); Petition from David Cashdan, 
Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Counsel for NAACP, to FCC (Jan. 18, 1971) (In the Mat-
ter of AT&T Revision of Tariff FCC No. 263; AT&T Transmittal No. 11027, NAACP 
Papers, Part V, Box 353, Folder 1). 
169 Order of FCC (Jan. 21, 1971) (In the Matter of Petitions of the EEOC et al., 
Docket No. 19129, NAACP Papers, Part V, Box 352, Folder 8). 
170 Robert J. Samuelson, FCC Checking AT&T for Bias: FCC to Investigate Charges 
of Discrimination at AT&T, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1971, at A1; see also FCC Orders 
Hearing on Charges that AT&T Discriminates in Hiring: Accusations Were Made by 
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a national regulatory agency had decided to scrutinize the em-
ployment practices of the industry it oversees,” the article ob-
served.171 Over the winter, the AT&T case continued to grab head-
lines. The New York Times reported that the EEOC had submitted 
a 20,000-page report supporting its claim of discrimination by 
AT&T and its subsidiaries.172 The EEOC answered AT&T’s claims 
of improved minority hiring with system-wide evidence that AT&T 
and its operating companies segregated women and minorities into 
the lowest-skilled, lowest-paid positions.173 Then, in 1972, the FCC 
held what proved to be eye-catching public hearings in New York 
and Los Angeles. “AT&T Assailed as Racist Monopoly,” one 
headline ran.174 The significance of the AT&T action seemed to be 
settling in as the case proceeded. As one former AT&T employee 
noted, the company was the nation’s largest corporation in terms of 
its assets and number of employees, and the third-largest defense 
contractor.175 This one action could significantly alter the employ-
ment practices of an entire sector of the economy. 
Then the EEOC got blindsided by another administrative office. 
The General Service Administration (“GSA”) oversaw compliance 
with government contracts’ nondiscrimination provisions on behalf 
of the OFCC. In the fall of 1972, just as the EEOC started to attack 
AT&T’s defense, AT&T and the GSA announced a headline-
grabbing agreement that would have required AT&T to hire 
Equal Employment Opportunity Unit Seeking to Block Rate Boost, Wall St. J., Jan. 
22, 1971, at 10. 
171 Samuelson, supra note 170, at A1. 
172 Christopher Lydon, Job Bias at Bell Charged by Panel: 20,000-Page Report Finds 
Women Are Oppressed – Policy on Blacks Scored, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1971, at 1. 
AT&T had two dozen subsidiary operating companies, referred to as the “Bell Sys-
tem.” Phyllis A. Wallace, Introduction, in Equal Employment Opportunity and the 
AT&T Case 1 (Phyllis A. Wallace ed., 1976). 
173 Lydon, supra note 172, at 30.  
174 Grace Lichtenstein, AT&T Assailed as Racist Monopoly, N.Y. Times, May 9, 
1972, at 33. On the daily drama of the hearings, see Stockford, supra note 156, at 114–
32; see also Benton Williams, AT&T and the Private-Sector Origins of Private-Sector 
Affirmative Action, 20 J. Pol’y Hist. 542, 550–52 (2008) (detailing the hearings’ “flood 
of angry testimony”). 
175 Sanford L. Jacobs, Women Employes [sic] Call Bell System Duties Boring, Op-
pressive: Operators Tell Bias Hearings of Harassing by Supervisors, Discriminatory 
Leave Policy, Wall St. J., May 12, 1972, at 24; see also Wallace, supra note 172, at 1 
(describing the Bell System, with close to 800,000 employees, as the “largest private 
employer in the country”).  
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women and minorities at one-and-a-half times their proportion of 
the population for about a year.176 As far as the EEOC was con-
cerned, the GSA had given AT&T a “sweetheart” deal, one that 
weakly defined equal employment and, the EEOC feared, would 
make it hard to achieve a more robust remedy in the FCC action.177 
William Brown was not going to be outmaneuvered that easily.178 
The EEOC cajoled a nervous OFCC to remove the AT&T matter 
from the GSA’s jurisdiction. A young OFCC attorney brought the 
various government offices that were looking into AT&T’s hiring 
practices together to negotiate a universal settlement with the 
company. It took four months of hard bargaining to reach an 
agreement, but in January 1973, the government announced a 
landmark settlement with AT&T. 
The new settlement was far more extensive than the GSA’s. It 
set hiring goals and timetables for their fulfillment. Thanks to the 
EEOC’s persistence, it also opened management training to 
women for the first time and altered the existing qualifications for 
jobs that had traditionally been held almost exclusively by white 
men. Moreover, it included about a thirty-five-million-dollar pay-
out, path-breaking for its size and for what it compensated: the 
largest ever back-pay award, an unprecedented restitution provi-
sion for employees who would have been promoted sooner or 
earned more absent company discrimination, and incentive pay-
ments to workers, male and female, to switch into nontraditional 
employment.179 The first action under the FCC’s rules resulted not 
only in opening traditionally male jobs to women, but also further 
attacked gender stereotypes by encouraging men to do jobs long 
identified as women’s work. Equal employment rulemaking and 
176 Eileen Shanahan, A.T.&T. in Accord on Minority Jobs: U.S. Accepts 15-Month 
Plan on Hiring and Promotion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1972, at 29; A.T.&T. Hiring Plan 
OKd, Chi. Trib., Sept. 21, 1972, at B8; AT&T Sets Equal-Hiring Accord With GSA 
To Increase Women, Minorities in Top Jobs, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1972, at 5. 
177 Harvey D. Shapiro, Women on the Line, Men at the Switchboard: Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comes to the Bell System, N.Y. Times Mag., May 20, 1973, at 
26, 77. For the backstory to the GSA’s agreement with AT&T, see Stockford, supra 
note 156, at 150–64. 
178 The bulk of this and the following paragraph are drawn from Stockford, supra 
note 156 at 150–199. 
179 Id. at 183, 188–89 (noting that it was EEOC negotiators who pressed AT&T to 
agree to open craft and other well-paying jobs to minorities and women, as well as to 
provide back pay and promotional pay). 
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the equal protection theories that informed it had affected an en-
tire industry.180 
As the news reports dubbing the settlement “precedent-setting” 
and a “landmark” piled up, the EEOC rode the wave of media at-
tention to new power and prominence.181 As one reporter noted, 
the EEOC’s “comparatively low profile . . . was strikingly altered” 
by the AT&T settlement.182 The case also attracted the attention of 
the business community. Equal employment consulting firms were 
said to be popping up everywhere, serving worried employers look-
ing for advice. “[A]fter the A.T.&T. settlement, it’s clear that a 
number of employers are going to be held responsible for past ac-
tions—and it’s going to cost them a lot of money,” one article pre-
dicted.183 
If this was employers’ concern, they had reason to be worried. 
Over the summer, the price tag on the settlement grew to fifty mil-
lion dollars.184 Meanwhile, the EEOC filed 150 cases against major 
corporations and assembled a national team of lawyers to “do the 
same thing as AT&T [sic] all over again.”185 William Brown had 
180 For disagreement about the settlement’s effectiveness, compare id. at 212–13, and 
Lois Kathryn Herr, Women, Power, and AT&T: Winning Rights in the Workplace 
156–63 (2003) (emphasizing the settlement’s positive effect, particularly on women’s 
opportunities), with Venus Green, Race on the Line: Gender, Labor, and Technology 
in the Bell System, 1880–1980, at 237–42 (2001) (arguing that racism and sexism in the 
telecommunications industry changed little as a result of the AT&T settlement). Re-
gardless of its long-term effects, the settlement is underappreciated in employment 
discrimination history. It preceded the better-known 1974 steel industry consent de-
cree reached under Title VII. Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, 
Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism 170–76 (1998). Whereas Title VII 
had previously transformed southern textile mills, the EEOC’s action against AT&T 
accomplished in one fell swoop what had required workers to file hundreds of indi-
vidual complaints in the textile industry. Nancy MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: 
The Opening of the American Workplace ch. 3 (2006). Finally, the FCC adopted its 
equal employment rules, and the EEOC sought to enforce them, based, in part, on 
the Constitution, revealing a constitutional, as well as statutory, basis to private em-
ployers’ changed practices. 
181 William Chapman, AT&T Agrees to Pay Victims Of Alleged Discrimination, 
Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1973, at 1; Shapiro, supra note 177. 
182 Douglas W. Cray, Job Discrimination Charges Grow: Federal Agency’s Efforts 
Broaden, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1973, at 170. 
183 Shapiro, supra note 177, at 90. 
184 Jo Anne Levine, Landmark Bias Case Settlement, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1973, at 
G1. 
185 Id. 
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reason to call the AT&T deal “the most significant legal settlement 
in the civil rights employment history.”186 
The FCC’s equal employment rules and the administrative con-
stitutionalism that helped the Agency conceive, adopt, and enforce 
them, had achieved an unprecedented triumph over employment 
discrimination. Regulatory relationships were used to impose equal 
employment nationwide. These administrators’ constitutionalism 
was influenced by, but also operated with some independence 
from, the presidency. Indeed, these administrative constitutional-
ists persisted despite the shift from a Johnson administration in-
structed to implement equal protection to a Nixon presidency with 
a mixed record on civil rights.187 Nonetheless, administrators con-
tinued to assert a broad view of state action and an affirmative un-
derstanding of equal protection as they fulfilled their roles as in-
terpreters, advocates, or policy implementers. At the same time, 
their constitutionalism was dynamic. Instead of being held over 
from the Kennedy-Johnson years, administrators’ constitutionalism 
evolved as Nixon-era officials used the Constitution to pursue 
novel administrative goals and new theories of sex discrimination. 
B. The FPC Rejects Equal Employment Rules 
The significance of administrators’ creative constitutional inter-
pretations is all the more evident when the FCC is contrasted with 
the FPC. If the FCC outstripped the Court in how broadly and af-
firmatively the FCC viewed equal protection, the FPC moved 
against the trend of the Court’s decisions by creatively narrowing 
Court doctrine. As with the FCC, congressional nudging and ex-
ecutive actions influenced the FPC, but the FPC’s constitutional 
course cannot be reduced to an instance of legislative or executive 
constitutionalism. 
1. The PCEEO Creatively Expands State Action 
Utility companies had long bedeviled the administrators who en-
forced government contracts’ nondiscrimination provisions. Rather 
186 Id. 
187 On Nixon’s complicated civil rights record, see Graham, supra note 11, pt. 3, and 
Carter, supra note 135, ch. 13. For his earlier civil rights positions, see Thurber, supra 
note 11. 
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than agree to the government’s antidiscrimination terms, utilities 
simply provided services without a contract. The PCEEO adminis-
trators who inherited this problem under President Kennedy were 
well aware that, practically speaking, their primary enforcement 
tool, cancelling power service to the federal government, was not 
an option. Instead, PCEEO administrators looked to the Constitu-
tion for novel ways to ensure that utilities provided equal employ-
ment. They quickly decided that a regulatory theory of state action 
was just the tool they needed. 
In a 1961 memo, PCEEO attorneys argued that utilities’ em-
ployment discrimination violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, irrespective of a government contract.188 The memo 
did not offer much in the way of argument. Instead, it quoted at 
length from Pollak and from a lower court case that held that 
“[w]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State 
with powers or functions governmental in nature they become in-
struments of the State and subject to the same constitutional limi-
tations as the State itself.”189 Making no effort to analogize utilities 
to the railroad station or streetcars at issue in these cases, the 
memo simply concluded that because utilities were franchised by a 
federal, state, or local government, they were clearly state actors 
under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.190 The PCEEO 
memo also argued that government had a constitutional duty to 
ensure nondiscrimination. In so arguing, the memo relied not only 
on case law, but also on the fact that every president since Roose-
velt had required “non-discrimination in Federal Employment by 
Executive Orders, based primarily on the due process clauses.”191 
Though the PCEEO attorneys cited case law, their approach to 
constitutional argument stretched holdings much further than any 
court, with little or no justification for doing so, and they relied on 
executive as well as judicial constitutional interpretations. 
The PCEEO’s Special Counsel asked the OLC for its opinion of 
his staff’s memo. The head of the OLC, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 
188 Memorandum from Hobart Taylor, Jr., Special Counsel, PCEEO, to Nicholas 
deB. Katzenbach, AAG, OLC (Oct. 4, 1961) (DOJ micro-copy) (enclosing memo by 
PCEEO attorneys). 
189 Id. at 6 (quoting Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 755 n.9 (5th Cir. 1961)), 9–10. 
190 Id. at 6, 10. 
191 Id. at 11. 
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thought the memo’s constitutional theory sound, acknowledging 
that “the quasi-governmental nature of a public utility may well 
impose certain duties on public utilities in the employment field.”192 
He noted, however, that this question was “as yet unexplored in 
the courts.”193 Nonetheless, Katzenbach eventually sent the 
PCEEO attorneys’ memo to the Civil Rights Division for a look. 
Richard Berg, the Civil Rights Division attorney assigned to the 
task, also found the PCEEO attorneys’ claim that public utilities 
were state actors “quite tenable.”194 He insisted that not all corpo-
rations were state actors, but conceded that utilities were different 
because they received special benefits such as monopoly privileges 
or eminent domain.195 However, even if a utility was a state actor in 
some respects, Berg doubted “that all its actions are state ac-
tions.”196 Although a utility could not constitutionally discriminate 
in service provision, he thought it unlikely that its constitutional du-
ties extended to employment discrimination because “as an em-
ployer it has no attributes of state power.”197 In other words, a util-
ity might be a state actor for some purposes, namely those for 
which it received its franchise, but not others. 
Katzenbach and Berg ultimately advised the PCEEO against 
testing its broad state action theory in the courts. They noted that 
the courts had not yet declared utilities’ employment practices 
state action and “guess[ed] that they were not ready to go that 
far.”198 They agreed, however, that the PCEEO could use this ar-
gument in its negotiations with utilities and endorsed the PCEEO 
looking into regulatory agencies’ authority to address the employ-
ment practices of their regulated industries.199 The PCEEO memo 
is another instance in which administrators embraced state action 
192 Letter from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, AAG, OLC, to Hobart Taylor, Jr., Spe-
cial Counsel, PCEEO 2 (Aug. 9, 1961) (DOJ micro-copy). 
193 Id. 
194 Memorandum from Richard K. Berg, Civil Rights Div. (“CRD”), DOJ, to Nicho-
las deB. Katzenbach, AAG, OLC (Oct. 10, 1961) (DOJ micro-copy). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Memorandum from Richard K. Berg, CRD, DOJ, to Files (Dec. 5, 1961) (DOJ 
micro-copy). 
199 Memorandum from Richard K. Berg, CRD, DOJ, to Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 
AAG, OLC, supra note 194; Memorandum from Richard K. Berg, CRD, DOJ, to 
Files, supra note 198. 
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theories that, in the view of the President’s closest legal advisors, 
courts had not and likely would not adopt. Several years would 
pass, however, before administrators revisited using the Constitu-
tion to reach utility companies’ discriminatory practices. 
2. The FPC Creatively Narrows State Action 
At the time the FCC proposed its first equal employment rule in 
1968, the FPC and EEOC were already working on employment 
discrimination in the FPC’s regulated industries. The FPC and 
EEOC began by urging utility companies to voluntarily adopt 
equal employment policies.200 By early 1969, however, the FPC was 
also exploring the possibility of a more demanding regulatory ap-
proach. Internal memos by FPC attorneys recommended that the 
FPC state that it would not license or certify any business that dis-
criminated in employment and that the FPC propose rules to this 
effect.201 The FPC attorneys, like the FCC attorneys before them, 
advanced a statutory argument in favor of their policy recommen-
dations that turned, in part, on the Constitution. The FPC’s ani-
mating statutes required the Agency to regulate in the public inter-
est and to assure just and reasonable rates.202 The FPC attorneys 
argued that the FPC’s public interest duties obligated the FPC to 
consider the national policy against discrimination when licensing 
or certificating utilities.203 This national policy, the FPC attorneys 
noted, derived from the Constitution.204 Because of this constitu-
tional basis for the national policy against discrimination, the FPC 
attorneys reasoned, the FPC could demand equal employment 
even of utilities that were not technically violating Title VII; in 
200 Memorandum from David J. Bardin, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Fed. Power Comm’n, 
to Lee C. White, Chairman, Fed. Power Comm’n (Apr. 17, 1969), in Responsibilities 
of the Federal Power Commission in the Area of Civil Rights: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil Rights Oversight of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 90 
(1972) [hereinafter Responsibilities]; Federal Power Commission Oversight: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong. 35–36 (1970) (statement of John Nassikas, Chair-
man, Fed. Power Comm’n). 
201 Memorandum from David J. Bardin to Lee C. White, in Responsibilities, supra 
note 200, at 90. 
202 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824, 824d (2006). 
203 Memorandum from Robert A. Jablon to David J. Bardin, Deputy Gen. Counsel, 
Fed. Power Comm’n (Apr. 17, 1969), in Responsibilities, supra note 200, at 99–109. 
204 Id. at 104 n.10, 109. 
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other words, Title VII embodied this constitutional policy, but did 
not delimit it.205 In fact, the FPC attorneys urged, the constitutional 
basis for the national policy against discrimination “may limit an 
agency’s discretion not to take affirmative action in furtherance of 
that policy.”206 The FPC attorneys did not provide any citations to 
support this conclusion. Instead, they used a broad, nondoctrinal, 
constitutional principle to support economic regulators’ affirmative 
equal employment duties. 
The FPC soon had the opportunity to follow up on these sugges-
tions. In March of 1969, a legal services organization asked to in-
tervene in a west coast gas and electric utility’s license application, 
charging that the FPC should not approve the license until the 
company rectified what the lawyers described as abysmal minority 
hiring practices. That July, the FPC granted the organization’s re-
quest while at the same time signaling that it might join the FCC in 
proposing equal employment rules.207 The FPC’s Chairman, Lee C. 
White, had been a close legal advisor to Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson, often working on civil rights issues, including equal em-
ployment policies. White announced that the FPC ought to address 
the issues raised by the legal services lawyers “in a general rule-
making proceeding of the type recently initiated by the Federal 
Communications Commission.”208 The FPC’s Chair seemed to be 
on the same page as its legal counsel and willing to take policy cues 
from a coordinate agency. 
Over the summer, the FPC chairmanship shifted from Lee White 
to John Nassikas, who was expected to be lenient toward the utili-
ties.209 It was not immediately clear, however, if the shift from a 
Johnson to a Nixon appointee and from a Democrat to a Republi-
can would end the FPC’s exploration of its employment discrimina-
tion regulatory powers; it certainly had not at the FCC. In Septem-
ber 1969, the FPC allowed the legal services lawyers to defend 
their claim.210 The next January, signs of serious policy discussions 
205 Id. at 106, 109. 
206 Id. at 109. 
207 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 42 F.P.C. 243, 243–44 (1969). 
208 Id. at 243. 
209 The Nixon Look: Regulatory Agencies Take Pro-Business Cast with New Nomi-
nees, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1969, at 1. 
210 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 42 F.P.C. 645 (1969). 
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continued. The FPC’s new General Counsel, Gordon Gooch, asked 
the Civil Rights Division for an advisory opinion on the issues the 
legal services lawyers had raised.211 Meanwhile, the FPC granted 
civil rights groups permission to file briefs on the pending west 
coast license.212 At the same time, Nassikas, when pressed by two 
questioners during a Senate hearing on unrelated matters, testified 
that his Agency would “try to assure” that utilities more rapidly 
improved equal employment opportunity, although he declined to 
say if the FPC had the power to demand that utilities do so.213 Ap-
parently, Nassikas’s FPC was carefully considering its employment 
discrimination responsibilities. 
Civil rights groups and senators were not the only ones pressur-
ing the FPC to act. When the FCC began its rulemaking process, 
the Civil Rights Commission began asking the major regulatory 
agencies what they were doing to ensure that the firms they regu-
lated were following equal employment practices.214 Apparently, 
the Civil Rights Commission was not happy with what it found. In 
the fall of 1970, the Civil Rights Commission issued a scathing re-
port detailing the nation’s lack of progress on civil rights. An entire 
chapter was devoted to critiquing regulatory agencies’ perform-
ance.215 The Commission noted the FCC’s early signs of promise. 
The Commission especially praised the FCC’s common carrier 
rules, noting that the FCC’s “regulatory relationship to broadcast-
ing stations is much closer than to telephone and telegraph compa-
nies.”216 Other agencies might have deemed the FCC’s reasons for 
requiring broadcasters to demonstrate equal employment practices 
peculiar because of the FCC’s unusually close regulatory relation-
ship to broadcasters. The FCC’s regulation of common carriers, 
however, was more analogous to the other major agencies’ regula-
211 Letter from Gordon Gooch, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Power Comm’n, to David L. 
Norman, AAG, CRD, Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 29, 1971), in Responsibilities, supra note 
200, at 67. 
212 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 44 F.P.C. 1365, 1366 (1970). 
213 Fed. Power Commission Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy, 
Natural Resources, and the Environment of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong. 
35–36 (1970) (statement of John Nassikas, Chairman, Fed. Power Comm’n). 
214 U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Fed. Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: A Report of 
the Commission 813–45 (1970) [hereinafter Civil Rights Enforcement]. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 837. 
LEE_POST_EIC 5/19/2010 11:36 AM 
850 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:799 
 
tion of their respective industries. Thus, while “the FCC’s action 
with respect to the broadcasting industry could be considered 
unique . . . , its extension of the rule to telephone and telegraph 
companies would have potentially far-reaching significance as 
precedent for other regulatory agencies.”217 
As for other agencies acting on this precedent, the Civil Rights 
Commission was decidedly disappointed. It acknowledged the 
FPC’s gestures of interest, but remained unimpressed with what it 
saw as the Agency’s foot-dragging.218 Other agencies were skew-
ered for denying that they had the authority to monitor regulated 
firms’ employment practices or for failing to consider the issue.219 
As the New York Times observed, the Civil Rights Commission 
had found that “the march toward full equality has bogged down in 
a morass of bureaucracy, lassitude, and indifferent leader-
ship . . . .”220 
The Civil Rights Commission clearly saw this as the beginning of 
the story, not the end. For any agency that doubted its authority to 
regulate businesses’ employment practices, the report explained 
each agency’s statutory obligation to regulate in the public interest, 
and thus to ensure that the businesses they regulated practiced 
equal employment. In addition, its authors underscored, “there is a 
serious question whether failure to do so places these agencies in 
the position of violating the United States Constitution.”221 Empha-
sizing its view of government’s constitutional duties, the report 
provided a twenty-page appendix making the constitutional case 
for mandatory agency regulation.222 
Like the Civil Rights Commission’s comment to the FCC, the 
report’s appendix adopted a version of the Supreme Court’s sig-
nificant-involvement state action theory that was astonishingly 
broad. Instead of the significant involvement the Court required, 
the Commission extended the logic of cases such as Burton and 
Pollak to argue that equal protection duties adhered if there was 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 838 & n.41. 
219 Id. at 838–39 & n.41, 840.  
220 Jon Nordheimer, A Highly Critical View of Progress on Rights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
18, 1970, at E3. 
221 Civil Rights Enforcement, supra note 214, at 844. 
222 Id. at 1095–115. 
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merely “some measure of involvement or interdependence” be-
tween the state and otherwise private actors.223 Once again, the 
Commission argued that this involvement should be measured in 
terms of the contacts between the government and the private ac-
tor. Regulatory agencies exerted “extensive control over their re-
spective industries,” including issuing licenses and certificates of 
authority, setting rates, and regulating the safety and quality of 
regulated firms’ services.224 According to the Civil Rights Commis-
sion, “[t]he pervasive presence of the agency in the most vital eco-
nomic matters which a company must face . . . should satisfy any 
test based on sufficiency of contacts.”225 
Like Hughes Tool and the FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo, the Civil 
Rights Commission also adopted a broad sanctioning theory of 
state action. Setting the bar for what constitutes sanctioning quite 
low, the Civil Rights Commission argued that regulatory agencies 
“are prohibited from permitting discrimination in their fields of 
regulation.”226 Under this theory, regardless of the degree of con-
tacts between agencies and industries, an agency must issue equal 
employment rules because government inaction in the face of dis-
crimination alone is unconstitutional.227 Relying on Burton and 
Hughes Tool, the Civil Rights Commission concluded that regula-
tory agencies “are under an affirmative duty to end any discrimina-
tory practices (including employment) of . . . all who deal with the 
agency whether the relationship be grantee, contractor, or regu-
lated licensee.”228 The Civil Rights Commission asserted that it was 
merely applying the “judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments,” but both its sufficiency-of-contacts and sanc-
223 Id. at 1101 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Burton and Pollak, see supra 
notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
224 Civil Rights Enforcement, supra note 214, at 1102–04.  
225 Id. at 1106. 
226 Id. at 1101. 
227 Id. at 1107. 
228 Id. at 1107. In support, the Civil Rights Commission quoted broad language in 
Burton that the state, “[b]y its inaction[,] . . . made itself a party” to its tenant’s dis-
crimination. Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 
(1961)). The Commission overlooked subsequent decisions in which the Court stated 
that something more affirmative was required in order to bring discrimination within 
equal protection’s ambit. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
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tioning theories of state action dramatically stretched Supreme 
Court doctrine.229 
Thus far, creative administrative constitutionalists had not ab-
jured court constitutionalism but imaginatively extended it, even as 
they supplemented it with other administrators’ interpretations. 
Extending Supreme Court doctrine was not creative interpreters’ 
only approach, however. With Nassikas at the helm and a new 
General Counsel in place, the FPC soon demonstrated a different 
kind of creative interpretation: narrowly reading court precedents 
and rejecting administrative authorities to reach entirely different 
constitutional conclusions. 
If the significance of the FPC’s change in chairmanship had 
seemed unclear at first, by the end of 1970 this was no longer the 
case. The FPC granted the west coast utility’s license and denied 
the legal services lawyers’ petition.230 In its order, the FPC recog-
nized the “national policy that discrimination in employment is to 
be eliminated by all elements of our society, public and private.”231 
The FPC even recognized that this policy arose out of the Constitu-
tion.232 However, it otherwise rejected the FPC attorneys’ prior 
statutory and constitutional analysis. The Agency now found that 
Congress had given the FPC no statutory command or even discre-
tionary leeway to require equal employment from the utilities it 
regulated.233 The FPC arrived at this latter conclusion by applying a 
novel nexus argument. The FPC contended that employment dis-
crimination was not sufficiently related to any of the Agency’s le-
gitimate regulatory purposes to fall within the FPC’s jurisdiction.234 
The FPC assured that it would continue to cooperate with the 
EEOC and to urge utilities to adopt equal employment policies. 
The FPC’s primary job, the order reminded, was nonetheless to en-
sure equal provision of services, not of employment.235 
229 Civil Rights Enforcement, supra note 214, at 1095–96, 1101–03. 
230 Pac. Gas & Elec., 44 F.P.C. 1365 (1970). 
231 Id. at 1368. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1366–67. If the petitioners had argued that the FPC had a constitutional ob-
ligation to regulate licensees’ employment practices, the FPC did not acknowledge it. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1368. Unfortunately, the National Archives do not have the records for this 
license petition, and I have been unable to find the petitioners’ arguments in other 
archives. 
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Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Commission fulfilled its watchdog 
role by putting public and political pressure on the FPC to act. In 
May 1971, it issued another report lambasting the FPC and other 
regulators for their continued inaction.236 Six months later, it pub-
lished a third evaluation of federal agencies’ civil rights record.237 It 
was not a favorable one. “Rights Panel Again Assails Efforts by 
U.S. Agencies,” the New York Times proclaimed. Equal employ-
ment rulemaking made front-page news once again.238 
As 1971 turned to 1972, equal employment rulemaking contin-
ued to be aired and debated publicly, this time on the Senate floor. 
Over the summer, Congress began considering contentious reforms 
to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.239 In the midst of this wrangling, the 
Senate debated an amendment which would have made EEOC 
complaints, Equal Pay Act claims, state fair employment actions, 
some Justice Department lawsuits, and individual Title VII cases 
workers’ exclusive remedies for employment discrimination.240 Pro-
ponents of the “Exclusive Remedy” Amendment wanted to shut 
down the equal employment rulemaking campaign. “This amend-
ment is only intended to eliminate actions brought before agencies 
or forums such as the NLRB, ICC, and FCC,” its sponsor testi-
fied.241 The amendment’s supporters argued that such actions were 
counter to congressional intent, led to harassed businesses defend-
ing similar charges in multiple forums, and allowed the EEOC to 
use other agencies “as mere rubber stamps for the application of 
sanctions . . . .”242 Opponents argued, in contrast, that the existing 
multiple remedies “are needed to implement the promise we make 
236 U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: Seven 
Months Later (May 1971).  
237 U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: One 
Year Later (Nov. 1971). 
238 Paul Delaney, Rights Panel Again Assails Efforts by U.S. Agencies, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 17, 1971, at 1. 
239 For a fuller history of these events, see Graham, supra note 11, at ch. 12.  
240 118 Cong. Rec. 3959 (1972).  
241 Id. at 3961. The Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) was considering an 
equal employment rulemaking petition of its own, as well as its fellow administrators’ 
view that the Constitution obligated it to ensure equal employment. See, e.g., William 
H. Brown III et al., EEOC, to ICC 9 (Dec. 1, 1971) (In the Matter of Ex Parte No. 278 
Equal Opportunity in Surface Transportation, NAACP Papers, Part V, Box 303, 
Folder 8).  
242 118 Cong. Rec. 3960 (1972). 
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under the Constitution to prevent discrimination in employ-
ment.”243 The amendment’s opponents won the vote.244 The door 
remained open for the FPC to adopt equal employment rules. 
This was not a door the FPC chose to walk through. Instead, 
administrative constitutionalists at the FPC engaged in their own 
creative interpretation, narrowly reading Supreme Court decisions 
and repudiating administrative authorities to dispute the FPC’s 
equal employment obligations. In September 1971, the Civil Rights 
Division finally addressed what was then a more than year-old re-
quest for advice on the FPC’s authority to monitor utilities’ em-
ployment practices. David Norman had succeeded Pollak as head 
of the Division. The FPC’s request was spurred by the long-since 
dismissed challenge to the west coast utility’s license. Nonetheless, 
Norman responded, assuring the FPC that its obligation to regulate 
in the public interest gave the FPC ample statutory authority to 
consider utilities’ employment practices and to issue equal em-
ployment rules. Adopting something like the Civil Rights Commis-
sion’s sufficiency-of-contacts rationale, Norman also advised that 
regulated utilities were constitutionally beholden state actors. “[I]n 
analogous situations,” he reasoned, “courts have held private busi-
nesses subject to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment obligations be-
cause of the extensive governmental regulation of their activi-
ties.”245 In addition, he noted, “where the government is a joint 
participant in an activity with private persons, courts have held that 
there is an affirmative obligation on the part of the government to 
insure compliance with constitutional provisions.”246 Here was an-
other administrator generously interpreting court precedent to 
deem regulated firms state actors and endorse agencies’ affirmative 
equal protection obligations. 
243 Id. at 3961. 
244 Id. at 3965. 
245 Advisory Opinion from David L. Norman, AAG, CRD, Dept. of Justice, to 
Gordon Gooch, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Power Comm’n (Sept. 17, 1971), in Responsibili-
ties, supra note 200, at 66 (citing Pollak). 
246 Id. (citing Burton). Norman cautioned that this duty might not extend to electric 
companies that lacked a federal hydroelectric license since they were regulated pri-
marily by state and local governments. According to Norman, they might well be state 
actors under the Fourteenth Amendment, which governed state, as opposed to fed-
eral, government actors, but “the existence of a duty on the part of the federal gov-
ernment to insure the companies’ compliance with its constitutional obligations [was] 
unclear.” Id. 
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To say that the FPC’s General Counsel was uninterested in 
Norman’s advice would be an understatement. In a prompt, icily 
cordial reply, Gordon Gooch reminded Norman of the time that 
had passed since Gooch made his request and informed him that 
the FPC had “made moot the need for such an informal opinion by 
its determination that such jurisdiction does not exist.”247 Gooch set 
about preparing an internal memo that took apart Norman’s rea-
soning from beginning to end.248 First, Gooch found no equal em-
ployment regulatory authority in the Agency’s authorizing statutes, 
their legislative history, or the cases Norman cited. Like the FPC’s 
order denying jurisdiction over the west coast utility’s employment 
practices, Gooch argued that the FPC was required to consider 
utilities’ compliance only with national policies that were suffi-
ciently related to the FPC’s regulatory purpose. These included 
economic policies but not social policies like that against discrimi-
nation in employment.249 
Gooch also dismissed Norman’s constitutional advice. Like other 
creative administrative constitutionalists, Gooch looked to case law 
for guidance. But where others extended these decisions, Gooch 
narrowed them aggressively. In order to distinguish the Supreme 
Court’s state action decisions, Gooch read into them a nexus crite-
rion similar to that used in his statutory argument: a nexus criterion 
that the Court had never recognized. Gooch dismissed as unhelpful 
the cases finding that regulated entities were themselves subject to 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In cases such as Pollak, he 
noted, the regulatees’ impermissible actions were found to be 
within the regulating agency’s authority. Here, it was precisely this 
authority that was in question. If the FPC could not regulate em-
ployment practices, its regulatory relationship could not create 
constitutional duties for the utilities it oversaw.250 Creatively expan-
sive interpreters had focused on the quantity of contacts. Gooch 
asserted it was quality, not quantity, that mattered. Without a nexus 
between an agency’s regulation and its regulatee’s discrimination, 
247 Letter from Gordon Gooch, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Power Comm’n, to David L. 
Norman, AAG, CRD (Sept. 29, 1971), in Responsibilities, supra note 200, at 68.  
248 Memorandum from Gordon Gooch, Gen. Counsel, to Fed. Power Comm’n (Feb. 
17, 1972), in Responsibilities, supra note 200, at 61–65. 
249 Id. at 62. 
250 Id. at 64–65. 
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there was no state action. Ignoring Supreme Court decisions that 
drew a generalizable “significant involvement” state action stan-
dard from Burton,251 Gooch also argued that the Constitution did 
not oblige the FPC to require equal employment from the utilities 
it regulated because Burton applied exclusively to leased public 
property.252 As for Norman’s suggestion that the FCC’s rulemaking 
supported the FPC’s authority and obligation to act, the General 
Counsel found this simply ridiculous.253 Administrators might cite 
cases, but as they debated what, if any, equal employment policy-
making was required of them, they extended and narrowed Su-
preme Court doctrine, engaging in creative constitutional interpre-
tation. 
Gooch’s creative constitutionalism emboldened the FPC’s resis-
tance to congressional pressure. In 1970, the FPC’s Chairman, John 
Nassikas, had equivocated about his Agency’s equal employment 
duties when pressed by senators. When he returned to the House 
in 1972, his equivocating was over. In February, Congress passed 
Civil Rights Act amendments that would keep Title VII enforce-
ment in the courts, rather than give the EEOC power to adjudicate 
and remedy violations itself, as civil rights supporters had urged. 
Agency rules remained the only administrative means of enforcing 
equal employment. Eager to expand this approach, the House Sub-
committee for Civil Rights Enforcement called Nassikas to appear 
before it. The Subcommittee’s Chair, Representative Don Ed-
wards, a Democrat from California who was known as a civil rights 
stalwart, called Nassikas to task for failing to exercise what Ed-
wards described as the FPC’s statutory authority and affirmative 
constitutional duty to adopt equal employment rules.254 Other 
committee members, including a college classmate of Nassikas, 
used friendlier questions to draw out why the Chairman thought 
his Agency lacked any such authority.255 Nassikas emphasized that 
Congress had just amended the Civil Rights Act without saying 
251 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
252 Memorandum from Gordon Gooch, Gen. Counsel, to Fed. Power Comm’n, supra 
note 248, at 64. 
253 Id. at 63. 
254 Responsibilities, supra note 200, at 2, 12–33. On Edwards’s strong support of civil 
rights, see, for example, Letter from Joseph L. Rauh to James E. Stewart, NAACP 
(Apr. 24, 1974) (Joseph L. Rauh Papers, LCMD, Part I, Box 38, “NAACP” Folder).  
255 Responsibilities, supra note 200, at 2, 12–33. 
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that it expected economic regulatory agencies to enforce the Act’s 
equal employment policies.256 If he was aware of the Senate’s rejec-
tion of the Exclusive Remedy Amendment, he was not saying so. 
Nassikas did not seem likely to bow to Representative Edwards’s 
view of his Agency’s constitutional duties. 
By the early 1970s, both the general direction of Supreme Court 
precedent and a number of lower court cases supported adminis-
trators’ broad and affirmative version of equal protection.257 As a 
result, administrators’ creatively expansive state action theories 
now arguably comported well with court constitutionalism. After 
all, Justice Brennan had argued in 1966 that Congress could im-
plement equal protection differently than the Court as long as it 
did so more expansively.258 Perhaps the Court authorized adminis-
trators to do the same. If so, this only makes the FPC’s creatively 
narrow readings of the Court’s equal protection decisions more 
remarkable. 
In the absence of clear judicial rules, administrators practiced 
creative interpretation, extending and narrowing the Court’s state 
action doctrine, relying on or rejecting other administrators’ consti-
tutional interpretations, and embracing or eschewing administra-
tors’ authority to directly interpret the Constitution. At the same 
time, Nassikas’s contentious hearing before Representative Ed-
wards’s Subcommittee and the FCC’s implementation of its rules 
despite Nixon’s appointments suggest that administrative constitu-
tionalists retained some latitude with respect to the legislative and 
executive branches. 
III. SELECTIVE INTERPRETATION 
Between 1972 and 1974 the Supreme Court significantly nar-
rowed the scope of state action and specifically rejected the licens-
ing, sanctioning, and sufficiency-of-contacts theories through which 
administrators had justified equal employment rules. Nonetheless, 
administrators preserved their constitutional arguments by selec-
tively ignoring this unfavorable precedent. 
256 Id. at 7–8. 
257 See supra notes 40, 65–69, 159–62 and accompanying text. 
258 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–51 (1966). 
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A. The Supreme Court Narrows State Action 
In the early 1970s, the FPC had creatively narrowed Supreme 
Court doctrine, cutting against the gradually expansive trajectory 
of the Court’s decisions and adopting a nexus theory of state action 
the Court had never endorsed. But the Court would soon catch up 
with the FPC. Flush with four new Nixon appointees, during the 
summer of 1972, the Court explicitly rejected the licensing theory 
of state action first promoted in the FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo. 
Moose Lodge v. Irvis held that a liquor license was not sufficient to 
transform a private club into a state actor prohibited from exclud-
ing African-American guests.259 According to the Court, finding 
that all forms of state regulation converted regulated entities into 
state actors “would utterly emasculate the distinction between pri-
vate as distinguished from state conduct.”260 The Court reached 
back to its decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority but 
narrowed that decision’s significant-involvement rationale. Like 
Gooch, the Court emphasized the quality, not the quantity, of in-
volvement. Specifically, general involvement between the state and 
the private actor was no longer relevant; instead the state must 
“significantly involve[] itself with invidious discriminations” before 
it would be accountable for those acts.261 Here, the state licensing 
agency regulated many aspects of the club but played “absolutely 
no part in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest poli-
cies.”262 As a result, the Court would not impute constitutional ob-
ligations to the club. The decision appeared to endorse Gooch’s 
earlier nexus theory that neither the FPC nor the companies it 
regulated had constitutional equal employment duties because the 
FPC did not generally oversee companies’ employment practices. 
The Court left some wiggle room for supporters of equal employ-
ment rulemaking, specifically noting that its holding turned on the 
fact that these licensees were not state-authorized monopolies.263 If 
259 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972). 
260 Id. at 173. 
261 Id. at 173–74 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)). 
262 Id. at 175. 
263 Id. at 177. 
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asked, the Court might view the FPC’s regulated industries—many 
of which were licensed monopolies—quite differently.264 
The next year, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it was 
deeply divided over the scope of state action, although this time 
the signs pointed more towards retraction than expansion of the 
doctrine’s reach. The Court was reviewing a D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision that had found that broadcasters were state ac-
tors for First Amendment purposes and that the FCC had an af-
firmative duty to require that the broadcasters it regulated ensure 
free speech.265 The D.C. Circuit had rejected the licensing theory of 
state action,266 but it had found that the FCC’s relationship with 
broadcasters was extraordinarily, almost uniquely, extensive.267 
Applying a sufficiency-of-contacts state action theory derived from 
Burton, the D.C. Circuit found that licensed broadcasters were 
state actors. The D.C. Circuit also adopted something like a sanc-
tioning theory of state action. According to the court, “[s]pecific 
governmental acquiescence, as well as specific approval,” could 
constitute state action.268 On this basis, the D.C. Circuit found that 
the FCC had violated the First Amendment by allowing broadcast-
ers to adopt a ban on controversial political advertisements. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem v. Democratic National Committee, the Court reversed the 
D.C. Circuit on statutory grounds, but four Justices wanted to 
reach and reverse the lower court’s state action analysis, while only 
two defended it.269 Rejecting the sanctioning theory of state action, 
the plurality reasoned that, because the FCC did not foster, but 
merely declined to prohibit, the challenged action, “it cannot be 
said that the Government is a ‘partner’ to the action of the broad-
cast licensee complained of here, nor is it engaged in a ‘symbiotic 
264 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An 
American Historical Perspective, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1263, 1280 (1984) (describing elec-
tric utilities as regulated monopolies). 
265 Bus. Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 655 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited regulated broadcasters from re-
jecting all controversial advertising). 
266 Id. at 652 n.20 (“The mere existence of a licensing or delegation relationship is 
not, of course, enough by itself to establish state action . . . .”). 
267 Id. at 651–52. 
268 Id. at 652 n.23. 
269 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
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relationship’ with the licensee.”270 Encouragement, not mere per-
mission or inaction, was necessary to bring the broadcasters’ prac-
tices within the state action orbit. The plurality also reaffirmed 
Moose Lodge’s nexus limit on state action.271 Most tellingly, Justice 
Douglas, the only Justice to have vigorously defended the broad 
licensing theory of state action, conceded that his view had not 
been accepted by the Court and stated that he could find no other 
credible basis for ascribing the advertising ban to state action.272 
Once again, the Court left a small loophole through which equal 
employment rulemakers might fit. In Columbia Broadcasting, the 
Court considered that the broadcasters had First Amendment 
rights of their own.273 The utilities, broadcasters, and common car-
riers targeted by equal employment rules had no equivalent consti-
tutionally protected right to discriminate. 
The next year, the Supreme Court closed the remaining loop-
holes, putting the rulemakers’ constitutionalism at greater odds 
with Court doctrine. Again, the Court ruled that regulation alone 
did not convert regulated entities into state actors or make regula-
tors constitutionally liable for their regulatees’ actions; this time, 
however, the Court’s decision seemed to unambiguously reject the 
licensing theory of state action on which equal employment rule-
making had relied. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the 
Court ruled that the Constitution did not reach even state-licensed 
monopolies unless there was “a sufficiently close nexus between 
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity.”274 Only 
then could the challenged action “be fairly treated as that of the 
State itself.”275 The Court’s “close nexus” test elaborated the rea-
soning it had introduced in Moose Lodge and applied it to licensed 
monopolies like the broadcasters, utilities, and common carriers 
targeted by equal employment rules. The Supreme Court had en-
dorsed the FPC’s reasons why neither it nor the companies it regu-
lated were constitutionally required to ensure equal employment. 
270 Id. at 119. 
271 Id. at 119–20. 
272 Id. at 150. 
273 Id. at 120–21. 
274 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
275 Id. 
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The FPC’s constitutional theories were arguably no longer crea-
tive but conventional. The constitutional theories animating the 
FCC’s rules, on the other hand, might no longer be defensible.  
B. The Supreme Court Avoids Administrators’ Creative 
Interpretations 
Even as the Supreme Court retracted the state action doctrine in 
the ways presaged by the FPC’s creatively narrow interpretations, 
the supporters of equal employment rules pressed ahead. In late 
June 1972, just weeks after the Supreme Court issued Moose 
Lodge, the Center for National Policy Review (“the Center”), a 
public interest law clinic housed at Catholic University, petitioned 
the FPC for an equal employment rule on behalf of an increasingly 
diverse coalition of civil rights groups.276 The Center had ties to the 
administrative constitutionalism of the rulemaking campaign. It 
was founded by William Taylor, who had spent the Kennedy and 
Johnson years working for, and eventually directing the staff of, 
the Civil Rights Commission. Howard Glickstein, who worked on 
Hughes Tool as a Justice Department attorney and headed the 
Civil Rights Commission’s support for equal employment regula-
tory action, was now in private practice and was retained on the 
case. The FPC petition would be influenced by theories of adminis-
trators’ role as interpreters and implementers of the Constitution 
that dated back to the early 1960s. 
The Center’s petition made the usual statutory, policy, and con-
stitutional arguments. In fact, what is notable is just how familiar 
these arguments were. The Center made no effort to incorporate 
or distinguish the Court’s recent Moose Lodge decision. Instead of 
acknowledging Moose Lodge’s requirement that the state signifi-
cantly involve itself with the discriminatory conduct, the Center’s 
276 Memorandum and Petition from William L. Taylor & Raymond B. Marcin, Ctr. 
for Nat’l Policy Review (“CNPR”), Attorneys for NAACP, et al., to FPC (June 22, 
1972) (Docket No. RM-447, FPC, Docket Files, RG 138, National Archives, FRC Box 
55, Folder 1) [hereinafter CNPR Petition]. The Center’s clients were the NAACP, the 
National Urban League, MALDEF, NOW, the Women’s Equity Action League, the 
League of United Latin American Citizens in California, the Association for the Bet-
terment of Black Edison Employees, United Church, the Center for Community 
Change, the American G.I. Forum, the Mexican American Political Association, and 
United Native Americans, Inc. 
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petition reasoned from Glickstein’s familiar sufficiency-of-contacts 
rationale. Moose Lodge deemed a company a state actor only if the 
substantive areas regulated by the government included those in 
which the discrimination was said to have occurred. The petition-
ers, however, focused on quantity, not quality. Replicating the Civil 
Rights Commission’s argument more or less verbatim, the peti-
tioners reasoned that the “pervasive presence of the [FPC] in the 
most vital economic matters which an electric or gas utility com-
pany must face—rates, construction of facilities, interstate sales of 
electricity or gas, financial accounting systems, mergers, consolida-
tions and foreign transactions—satisfies any test of government in-
volvement based on sufficiency of contacts.”277 
The Center’s petition also ignored the anti-affirmative action 
turn in presidential politics. During the summer of 1972, a number 
of the country’s major Jewish organizations, including long-time 
supporters of workplace civil rights, came out against the kind of 
affirmative action programs in some proposed equal employment 
rules.278 Calling hiring quotas reverse discrimination (or “Crow 
Jimism,” as one commentator put it), they pressed the presidential 
candidates to take a stand.279 Although Nixon and his Democratic 
challenger, George McGovern, like the groups pressuring them to 
action, voiced continued support for affirmative action and equal 
opportunity, they came out publicly against proportional or quota-
based hiring.280 Within weeks, Nixon had even banned the federal 
government from using hiring quotas.281 This turn against propor-
tional hiring did not deter Glickstein and Taylor. As in the other 
rulemakings, the Center’s proposed rule required the FPC to en-
277 Id. at 35. See quote in text accompanying supra note 225. 
278 Irving Spiegel, Two Jewish Leaders Score Minority Job Quotas: H.E.W. Is Urged 
to Recast Its Guidelines and Repudiate “Preferential Treatment,” N.Y. Times, June 
30, 1972, at 11. 
279 Glenn Fowler, Nixon and McGovern Oppose Quotas to End Racial Disparity, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1972, at 12; Samuel Rabinove, Letter to the Editor, Crow 
Jimism, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1972, at 34; Spiegel, supra note 278, at 11. 
280 Fowler, supra note 279, at 12. 
281 Jon Katz, Nixon Bans Minorities’ Job Quotas, Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1972, at A1. 
Claims that affirmative action was reverse discrimination were not new, but the en-
dorsement of these liberal groups gave the claims prominence and credibility. For 
more on the history of anti-affirmative action claims, see MacLean, supra note 180, at 
185–224; Siegel, supra note 1, at 1473. 
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sure that regulated companies developed and implemented an af-
firmative action program.282 
In less than three weeks, what the New York Times called “an 
eyeblink in regulatory time,” the FPC denied the Center’s peti-
tion.283 The FPC laid out the statutory and constitutional arguments 
General Counsel Gooch had made in his internal memo. Under its 
statutes and the Constitution, the FPC was only required to 
counter discrimination to the extent that it had a nexus with the 
Agency’s statutory charge. In addition, the order, thought to have 
been penned by Nassikas due to its combative tone, reaffirmed that 
the Commission’s Chair was no fan of extra-court constitutional-
ism.284 The FPC insisted that only Congress could empower the 
Agency to act, stating, “[e]xecutive authority and constitutional 
considerations do not provide the basis for Commission jurisdic-
tion.”285 Furthermore, the FPC argued, the issues the petitioners 
raised “should be considered through judicial interpretation of 
regulatory statutes and laws and regulations governing employ-
ment practices.”286 If the petitioners did not like what the FPC had 
to say, the order suggested, they should ask a court to intervene. 
The FPC’s quick action did not allow government officials to 
weigh in on the petition, but EEOC Chairman Brown wrote to 
Nassikas, as one administrator to another, asking the FPC to re-
consider.287 Meanwhile, the petitioners filed for a rehearing.288 It was 
all to no avail. The FPC again acted in an “eyeblink,” denying the 
petitioners’ request.289 The FPC, it appeared, was challenging 
Glickstein and Taylor to take their theories to court. 
The Center had to decide whether to find out what a court 
thought of their state action theories. An unfavorable ruling would 
be hard to ignore. Asking administrators to expansively read court 
282 CNPR Petition, supra note 276, at 40–47. 
283 Edward Cowan, A Fair-Jobs Role Barred by F.P.C.: Agency Says It Cannot Deal 
with Hiring by Utilities, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1972, at 11. 
284 Id. 
285 NAACP et al., 48 F.P.C. 40, 42 (1972). 
286 Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
287 Letter from William H. Brown III, Chairman, EEOC, to John N. Nassikas, 
Chairman, FPC (July 13, 1972) (FPC Docket No. RM-447, FRC Box 55, Folder 1). 
288 Petition from William L. Taylor & Robert B. Marcin to FPC (Aug. 8, 1972) (FPC 
Docket No. RM-447, FRC Box 55, Folder 1). 
289 NAACP et al., 48 F.P.C. 371 (1972). 
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doctrine was one thing; asking them to directly disobey a disfavor-
able court decision would be quite another.290 In the end, the Cen-
ter took the FPC up on its challenge, petitioning the D.C. Circuit 
for review.291 The EEOC filed an amicus brief in support. The Cen-
ter’s decision to take a recalcitrant FPC to court might force a con-
frontation between the constitutional theories underlying the 
FCC’s rules and the Court’s increasingly distinct view of the Con-
stitution.292 
During 1973, the Center’s petition received further judicial and 
political blows. The Watergate scandal engulfed the White House 
and reached further into the President’s cabinet, raising concerns 
about government secrecy and dysfunction to new levels. Con-
sumer advocates like Ralph Nader added to administration’s grow-
ing taint by issuing numerous reports charging agencies with cap-
ture by corporate interests.293 Opposition to affirmative action also 
gathered steam, as federal courts began to seriously consider re-
verse discrimination challenges to these policies. A prominent case 
charging that equal protection limited rather than required affirma-
290 Agency nonacquiescence to lower federal courts’ decisions is hotly debated. 
Compare Samuel Eistreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679 (1989), Mashaw, supra note 14, at 513–15, 
and Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Ad-
judication, 77 Geo. L.J. 1815 (1989) (recognizing broad, moderate, and very limited 
instances, respectively, when agency nonacquiescence is justified), with Dan T. Coe-
nen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 
1339 (1991), and Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence 
and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Eistreicher and Revesz, 99 
Yale L.J. 801 (1990) (arguing against agency nonacquiesence). 
291 Petition for Review from Howard A. Glickstein & William L. Taylor, Attorneys, 
CNPR, and Robert Gnaizda & Albert Moreno, Pub. Advocates, Inc., MALDEF, to 
FPC (Oct. 12, 1972) (FPC Docket No. RM-447, FRC Box 55, Folder 1). 
292 Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 35–36 (1985) (not-
ing that welfare rights activists’ turn to the courts may have been ill-advised since ad-
ministrators were on the verge of creating far more robust procedural rights than 
those the Supreme Court ultimately ordered in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970)). 
293 See, e.g., Corporate Power in America 133, 231 (Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green 
eds., 1973); The Monopoly Makers: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on Regula-
tion and Competition (Mark J. Green ed., 1973) (asserting that regulatory agencies 
exacerbated rather than ameliorated the ill effects of concentrated corporate power). 
Nader popularized, but did not invent, the New Left critique of regulation. For its 
academic counterpart, see Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Pol-
icy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (1969). 
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tive action made its way to the Supreme Court.294 Meanwhile the 
Court indicated that, at least in the courts, only discriminatory in-
tent, not mere disparity, violated equal protection.295 The Court 
suggested that deference to states, legislatures, and administrators 
helped explain why it was taking this position.296 If so, supporters of 
equal employment rules could comfort themselves that agencies, 
which had neither the Court’s federalism nor institutional capacity 
concerns, could define equal protection differently.297 But the more 
court constitutionalism diverged from their own, the riskier the 
Center’s decision to take the FPC to court appeared. At the same 
time, Chairman Brown left the EEOC and seemed to take support 
for equal employment rules with him. His replacement had served 
as the Civil Rights Commission’s General Counsel during the years 
it urged equal employment rules; one of the new chairman’s first 
moves, however, was to express doubt about Brown’s company-
wide approach to battling employment discrimination.298 
294 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973) (agreeing to review a decision up-
holding a law school affirmative action admissions program). See Siegel, supra note 1, 
at 1526–27; see also Dennis Deslippe, Protesting Affirmative Action: The Struggle 
Over Equality in Post-Civil Rights America, ch. 4 (manuscript on file with the Vir-
ginia Law Review).  
295 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208, 211 (1973) (stating that intent distin-
guishes de jure segregation from de facto segregation and suggesting that only the 
former “warrant[s] judicial intervention”). Arguably, Keyes left open the possibility 
that intent might be rebuttably presumed based on disparity. See Note, Reading the 
Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Jure/De Facto Distinction, 
86 Yale L.J. 317, 332–36 (1976). 
296 Siegel, supra note 1, at 1511–12, notes that federalism concerns explain why 
courts in this period limited equal protection remedies to intentional government acts 
of racial classification. Courts suggested that state legislatures could voluntarily adopt 
race-conscious desegregation policies, even if courts should not impose them absent a 
finding of intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (noting that school officials have broad discretion to 
implement racial balancing policies, while courts cannot do so absent a finding of 
state-imposed segregation in violation of the Constitution); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that “the discre-
tionary power of public authorities to remedy past discrimination is even broader 
than that of the judicial branch”); see also Siegel, supra note 1, at 1525 n.190. 
297 But cf. Gillian Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 
2023, 2109 (2008) (encouraging present-day agencies to consider federalism principles 
when formulating policy). 
298 Paul Delaney, Action Reviewed on Bias Charges: New Rights Chief Doubts Use 
of Sweeping Actions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1974, at 36. 
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In February 1975, the D.C. Circuit finally issued a decision in 
NAACP v. Federal Power Commission.299 According to the court, 
the FPC lacked the statutory authority to adopt the “affirmative” 
equal employment rules petitioners had proposed. The court side-
stepped Jackson and the question of whether there was state action 
of the sort that would make equal protection reach regulated com-
panies’ employment practices. Instead, it held that even if there 
were state action, it would not (though the court hedged on this, 
noting that some cases suggested the contrary) require an agency 
to affirmatively prevent constitutional violations. The court rea-
soned that a state action finding typically devolved constitutional 
obligations onto the “ostensibly private entity.”300 The opinion also 
acknowledged that state action might place an affirmative obliga-
tion on the government to terminate its relationship with the dis-
criminating entity. But the court found little legal support for peti-
tioners’ claim that “the government must affirmatively regulate its 
private partner to insure that the latter discharges the constitu-
tional obligations devolving upon it because of” its relationship to 
the state.301 Indeed, the court noted that the Supreme Court in Co-
lumbia Broadcasting had overturned the D.C. Circuit’s only prece-
dent supporting such a proposition.302 The D.C. Circuit did not say 
that no obligation inheres in the regulatory relationship. Nonethe-
less, it warned that the Center’s proffered requirement “would 
raise many problems.”303 “[H]owever we might resolve our difficul-
ties with the proposition that the Commission is constitutionally 
required to adopt some anti-discrimination rule,” the court clari-
fied, “we are very sure that it is not required to adopt this one.”304 
The court nonetheless found that the FPC did have some statu-
tory authority to take utilities’ discrimination into account in de-
termining appropriate rate levels. Indeed, the court scolded, “[i]f 
the petitioners have been extravagant in their claims, . . . the 
Commission has been miserly in its response.”305 The court sug-
299 520 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
300 Id. at 445. 
301 Id. at 446. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 447.  
305 Id. 
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gested a number of ways the FPC could weigh regulated compa-
nies’ employment practices. Most enthusiastically, it proposed that 
the FPC, because it was statutorily required to charge “just and 
reasonable rates” to consumers, might discount the costs of dis-
criminating from the rates it approved.306 Recognizing that it was 
within the FPC’s discretion to take none of the proposed actions, 
the court vacated the FPC’s order and remanded the matter for re-
consideration. 
The D.C. Circuit had firmly rebuked the petitioners’ broad and 
affirmative equal protection theories, finding in their place a 
somewhat commodious statutory discretion to adopt more limited 
equal employment rules. At first glance, it might seem that the 
court had thereby rejected agencies’ role as constitutional inter-
preters. But the court did not completely shut down administrative 
constitutionalism. It addressed court enforcement of the petition-
ers’ claim. Saying that a court would not tell the FPC that it was 
constitutionally required to adopt the petitioners’ rule was quite 
different from saying that the FPC could not choose to do so—or 
even find itself so compelled. 
For the FPC, the court’s opinion had left too much open. The 
Solicitor General, Robert Bork, declined to appeal the ruling but 
gave the FPC permission to do so on its own behalf. Once the FPC 
petitioned the Supreme Court for review, however, Bork undercut 
its efforts by filing an amicus memo for the EEOC that endorsed 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion.307 Over the summer, the Center cross-
petitioned the Supreme Court for review.308 With the Court’s doc-
trine moving in a different direction, however, it was unlikely to 
adopt the Center’s broad state action theories and assertion of 
government’s affirmative equal protection duties. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in October 1975 and is-
sued its decision the following May. By then, not only had Court 
doctrine turned against the rulemakers’ constitutional theories, but 
both the left and the right, Democrats and Republicans, were vig-
306 Id. at 437, 443–44. 
307 Memorandum for the United States and the EEOC as Amici Curiae, NAACP v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (No. 74-1608, 74-1619); Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari, NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (No. 74-1619). 
308 Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 
662 (1976) (No. 74-1608). 
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orously attacking regulation itself. During 1975 and into 1976, 
Congress debated and eventually passed legislation that promised 
to shed disinfecting “sunshine” on distrusted agency activity.309 As 
the 1976 presidential campaign swung into gear, deregulation was 
both candidates’ buzzword.310 The Supreme Court was not immune 
to these trends. Court watchers remarked on its pro-business and 
anti-regulation turn.311 
Since the heyday of equal employment rulemaking, administra-
tive agencies had gone from seemingly powerful levers for social 
change to beleaguered targets of political opprobrium—part of the 
problem, not of the solution. Deregulation could threaten the fac-
tual predicate of licensing, sanctioning, and sufficiency-of-contacts 
state action theories and lessen the reach of the government’s af-
firmative obligations. The political outcry might also sap agencies’ 
willingness to act. 
The Supreme Court’s decision was hardly shocking. Just as So-
licitor General Bork had advocated, the Court more or less 
adopted the lower court’s approach. The Court avoided the peti-
tioners’ constitutional arguments, focusing on the FPC’s statutory 
duties instead.312 The Court also dismissed the claim that the FPC 
had expansive authority under its statute’s public interest provi-
sions, cautioning that these provisions were not “a broad license to 
promote the general public welfare.”313 Instead, as the FPC had 
contended, an agency was only authorized to regulate in the public 
interest insofar as those regulations were directly related to the 
agency’s statutory mandates. Under this standard, the Court ap-
proved the FCC’s rules because the FCC had a statutory duty to 
ensure that broadcasting “reflect[ed] the tastes and viewpoints of 
minority groups.”314 The FPC’s public interest charges, however, 
309 Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a) (Sept. 13, 1976) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)). 
310 See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis 
D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn 259 (1984); Washington & Business: 
Debate on Deregulation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1976, at 77. 
311 Wayne E. Green, Tipping the Scales: Supreme Court Shows a Pro-Business Tilt 
in Series of Rulings, Wall St. J., July 1, 1975, at 1. 
312 NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 665 n.2 (1976). 
313 Id. at 669. 
314 Id. at 670 n.7. The Court did not address the fact that this rationale did not apply 
to the FCC’s common carrier rules. 
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did not sweep so far. Instead, the Court found that the FPC had 
only the modest “duty to prevent its regulatees from charging rates 
based upon illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary labor costs.”315 The 
FPC should therefore disallow any costs that were “demonstrably 
the product of a regulatee’s discriminatory employment prac-
tices.”316 
The news media seemed decidedly confused about the signifi-
cance of the Court’s decision. While one headline read “Court 
Backs FPC Role on Job Bias,” another asserted “Agencies Needn’t 
Curb Industry Job Bias, Court Says.”317 In truth, they were both 
right. The FPC issued an order in July of 1976 stating that it under-
stood the Court to have upheld the FPC’s claim of limited author-
ity. In future rate proceedings, the FPC would use its existing au-
diting procedures to disallow the costs a court or agency 
determined had been incurred due to a regulated utility’s discrimi-
natory employment practices.318 But the FPC did not take the D.C. 
Circuit up on its other modest proposals, let alone implement the 
broad, affirmative equal employment obligations envisioned by the 
civil rights petitioners. 
Over the next several months, the Civil Aeronautics Board and 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”), which had been 
sitting on petitions for equal employment rules since the early 
1970s, issued notices more or less to the same effect.319 The Court 
had decided in NAACP v. Federal Power Commission that agen-
cies’ statutes required very little of them. If the Constitution re-
quired any more, neither the agencies nor the Court would impose 
it. 
315 Id. at 668. 
316 Id. 
317 John P. MacKenzie, Court Backs FPC Role On Job Bias, Wash. Post, May 20, 
1976, at A1; Linda Mathews, Agencies Needn’t Curb Industry Job Bias, Court Says, 
L.A. Times, May 20, 1976, at 1. Compare F.P.C. Rights Role is Found Limited: Su-
preme Court Says Agency Cannot Order Job Equality, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1976, at 
31, with High Court Clears FPC to Consider Bias In Jobs in Passing on Utility Rate 
Boosts, Wall St. J., May 20, 1976, at 4. 
318 Accounting for Fed. Power Commission (July 15, 1976) (Docket No. R-447, Or-
der on Completion of Judicial Review of Commission Opinion No. 623, NAACP Pa-
pers, Part V, Box 353, Folder 6). 
319 Discrimination of Airline Employment, Notice Terminating Proceeding, Civil 
Aeronautics Board (Aug. 13, 1976) (Docket No. 24636, NAACP Papers, Part V, Box 
353, Folder 6); Equal Opportunity in Surface Transportation, 353 I.C.C. 425 (1977). 
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Regardless of the decision’s effect on equal employment rule-
making, it would be wrong to depict NAACP v. Federal Power 
Commission as a loss for administrative constitutionalism. For over 
a decade, administrators had argued that agencies’ public interest 
mandates authorized, and possibly required, them to ensure that 
the businesses they regulated did not violate the national policy 
against discrimination or the Fifth Amendment from which it 
arose. This was the primary basis for the FCC’s broadcasting and 
common carrier rules, a basis the Court now rejected. At the same 
time, NAACP v. Federal Power Commission skirted the validity of 
administrative constitutionalism and of the constitutional theories 
animating this particular instance of it. By refusing to reach either 
the Center’s or the FPC’s arguments about agencies’ and their 
regulatees’ direct constitutional duties, the Court avoided challeng-
ing, or endorsing, those administrative constitutionalists’ creative 
interpretations. The Court also had no occasion to dispute adminis-
trators’ interpretive authority. In addition, the decision had noth-
ing to say about whether and when the Constitution could turn an 
agency’s statutory can do into a constitutional will—or must—do. 
Ultimately, the decision left ample room for administrators’ consti-
tutionalism to develop. 
C. The FCC Selectively Interprets State Action 
As it turned out, administrative constitutionalism persisted. In 
fact, in the years following NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 
FCC attorneys moved beyond creatively interpreting Supreme 
Court precedent to selectively ignoring it. In June 1976, the Court 
appeared to deal the rulemakers yet another blow when it held, in 
Washington v. Davis, that racial disparities in hiring alone did not 
violate equal protection.320 Then again, the Court justified its rule in 
part on the deference courts owe administrative action.321 If the 
FCC examined the case’s impact on its equal employment rules, 
perhaps it reasoned that it could continue to use hiring disparities 
to prove discrimination, even if a court would not require it to do 
320 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
321 Id. at 247–48 (explaining that examining disparate effects “involves a more prob-
ing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of adminis-
trators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution”). 
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so. Soon after Davis, the FCC clarified the affirmative action its 
equal employment rules required of broadcasters.322 Although the 
FCC stated that it would not require statistical parity in hiring, the 
FCC would continue to look at statistics to determine whether li-
censees’ minority and female hiring levels were within a “zone of 
reasonableness.”323 
The order gave no mention of the Constitution, but that did not 
mean that the FCC had rejected a constitutional basis for its rules. 
The next year, J. Clay Smith, Jr., the former Deputy Chief of the 
FCC’s Cable Television Bureau and its current Associate General 
Counsel, gave a speech at the annual meeting of the National Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting. Smith’s speech demonstrated 
that neither court doctrine nor deregulatory fervor had interred 
equal employment rulemaking or the administrative constitutional-
ism that fed it.324 
Smith vigorously defended the FCC’s equal employment rules 
on statutory and constitutional grounds. In part, Smith relied on 
the statutory service-provision rationale the Supreme Court en-
dorsed in NAACP v. Federal Power Commission.325 Yet Smith also 
justified the rules on grounds the Supreme Court had directly or 
indirectly rejected. Espousing arguments that dated back to the 
FCC attorneys’ 1963 memo, Smith argued that the Communica-
tions Act’s public interest provisions gave the FCC the “authority 
and duty . . . to consider the provisions of the United States Consti-
tution and the public policies established thereunder,” including 
the policy against racial discrimination.326 Smith also noted that 
there was a “strong argument” that the FCC was constitutionally 
“compelled to consider whether an applicant practices racial dis-
crimination in the use of his authorization” and that its licensees 
must also be “measured by the standards of the Constitution.”327 As 
support, Smith invoked the same licensing and sanctioning theories 
322 In the Matter of Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of 
Broad. Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226 (1976). The order also gives a useful summary of 
the FCC’s intervening amendments to its broadcast equal employment rules as well as 
its enforcement of them. 
323 Id. ¶ 56. 
324 Smith, supra note 1. 
325 Id. at 6–11; see supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
326 Id. at 14. 
327 Id. at 14–15. 
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of state action that his office had formulated in the early 1960s, ig-
noring the Court’s more recent Moose Lodge, Columbia Broad-
casting, and Jackson decisions.328 In fact, the constitutional parts of 
Smith’s speech appeared to be lifted almost directly from the 1963 
memo.329 While some of Smith’s citations had been updated since 
1963, his constitutional arguments largely had not.330 
Apparently administrators were still affirmatively interpreting 
the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees and broadly defin-
ing state action.331 Smith’s speech indicates that administrators were 
willing to do more than creatively extend or narrow court doctrine; 
they were also willing to selectively ignore unfavorable prece-
dent.332 
IV. RESISTANT INTERPRETATION 
The FCC’s view that it could, should, and was implementing 
equal protection through its equal employment rules persisted into 
the twenty-first century, despite dramatic changes in the Supreme 
328 Id. at 15 & n.5 (arguing that under Pollak, giving a license to a discriminator was 
“tantamount to the sanctioning of the discriminatory practices” and that a licensee 
was a “public trustee” and thus, like the lessee in Burton, was a state actor “held to 
the same standard as the Government, viz., compliance with the Fifth Amendment”). 
329 Compare language supra notes 324–28 and accompanying text with that supra 
notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
330 Smith, supra note 1, at 15 n.4 (citing Note, F.C.B.A. [B]riefing Conference on 
Equal Employment Guidelines, 24 FCBJ 3, 12 (1970)). 
331 Other government attorneys also found administrative action based on the Con-
stitution little affected by recent Supreme Court decisions. Memorandum from An-
tonin Scalia, AAG, OLC, for the Solicitor Dep’t of Labor: Dues-Paying Practices of 
Private Clubs, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 220, 224 (1976) (advising that the federal 
government could enforce “equal protection standards” in its rules for government 
contractors and could continue to determine equal employment violations using ef-
fects-based standards because Washington v. Davis did not proscribe the government 
from doing so).  
332 In 1980, the FCC rejected a claim that its failure to add disability discrimination 
to its equal employment rules violated disabled persons’ First and Fifth Amendment 
rights. In the Matter of Amendment of Broad. Equal Employment Opportunity Rules 
and FCC Form 395, 80 F.C.C.2d 299, ¶¶ 10–11 (1980). The FCC argued that it could 
constitutionally treat disabled people differently than the groups its equal employ-
ment rules covered. Id. The FCC also now relied on recent Supreme Court decisions 
declaring that licenses did not devolve constitutional responsibility on licensees and 
that government’s failure to act did not make it responsible for private discrimination. 
Id. As the rest of Part IV demonstrates, however, this did not end the FCC’s inde-
pendent interpretation of equal protection. 
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Court’s equal protection doctrine. The FCC’s view even persisted 
after the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s equal employment 
rules in 1998 as a race-conscious violation, not a vindication, of 
equal protection.333 The FCC complied with the court’s judgment, 
but it continued to insist that its equal employment rules imple-
mented equal protection. The recent history of the FCC’s rules 
suggests that the administrative constitutionalism that helped bring 
them into being persists in form, if not precisely in substance.  
A. The Supreme Court Restricts Affirmative Action 
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s multi-factor state action 
tests rendered that doctrine quite malleable, while the Court’s fact-
specific analyses left many private-public relationships, including 
many regulatory relationships, unmapped. This created a fertile 
field for creative interpretations by administrators who were more 
willing than the Supreme Court, Congress, or the Attorney Gen-
eral to implement “the full limits of the constitutional power con-
tained in the 14th amendment.”334 During the 1970s, however, the 
Supreme Court began to place swaths of regulatory relationships 
outside the ambit of state action. In order to sustain their broad 
state action theories, administrators who defended equal employ-
ment rules moved from creatively to selectively interpreting Su-
preme Court doctrine. 
By the late 1970s, a similar process was under way with respect 
to administrators’ contention that the affirmative action programs 
called for by equal employment rules implemented equal protec-
tion. Opposition to affirmative action gathered over the decade, 
and, in the courts, plaintiffs were increasingly arguing that affirma-
tive action programs violated rather than vindicated equal protec-
tion.335 In 1978, the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke.336 For the Court, the 
question was not whether the University was compelled by equal 
protection to implement its affirmative action admissions program, 
333 See infra notes 343–45 and accompanying text.  
334 Kennedy House Statement, supra note 56, at 2656.  
335 On the gathering opposition to affirmative action, see supra notes 278–81, 293 
and accompanying text.  
336 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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or even whether the University was allowed to implement equal 
protection by adopting this program. Instead, the Court was asked 
to determine whether the University’s affirmative action program, 
which set a minimum quota for minority admissions, violated equal 
protection. The Court struck down the University’s program. Only 
Justice Powell reached this conclusion on equal protection 
grounds.337 His opinion, which applied strict scrutiny to the Univer-
sity’s affirmative action program, nonetheless stopped short of 
deeming all such programs unconstitutional.338 
Subsequently, the story of the Constitution and affirmative ac-
tion in the courts was one of equal protection limiting state institu-
tions’ affirmative action plans.339 During the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the Court seemed to understand the Constitution to grant Con-
gress more leeway to adopt, and federal agencies to require, af-
firmative action programs than it granted the states.340 Importantly, 
in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the 
FCC’s minority ownership program on the grounds that it fur-
thered the “the important governmental objective of broadcast di-
versity.”341 In 1995, however the Supreme Court, in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, overruled Metro Broadcasting and 
determined that federal affirmative action policies, like state poli-
cies, violated equal protection if they could not pass strict scru-
tiny.342 Adarand left open some possibility that congressionally en-
acted programs would be due greater deference than state 
337 Id. at 319–20. Justice Powell commanded a majority only for the judgment he 
reached, not his opinion. The four other Justices in the majority struck the program 
down as a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
338 Justice Powell’s opinion left room for state actors to use race to promote diver-
sity. Id. at 314–19. 
339 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (holding 
that minority business set-asides violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 272–73 (1986) (declaring a minority lay-off provi-
sion unconstitutional). 
340 Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565–66 (1990) (upholding the FCC’s minority 
ownership affirmative action policy after applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to 
determine whether it violated equal protection); Croson, 488 U.S. at 489–92 (distin-
guishing Congress, which had authority to remedy discrimination under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, from states, whose minority set-aside programs must comply 
with § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476–78 
(1980) (upholding a minority set-aside program enacted by Congress). 
341 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 600. 
342 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
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programs, even under the strict scrutiny standard. Nonetheless, the 
opinion’s analysis focused on whether federal affirmative action 
programs violated, not vindicated, equal protection. 
B. The FCC Resists a Reviewing Court’s Constitutional 
Interpretation 
In 1998, the D.C. Circuit, in Lutheran Church v. Federal Com-
munications Commission (Lutheran I), finally struck down part of 
the FCC’s equal employment rules—not as an insufficient imple-
mentation of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees, 
but as a violation of them.343 The evolving court constitutionalism in 
which equal protection had come to constrain, rather than to re-
quire, equal employment rulemaking had finally caught up with the 
FCC. The Commission argued that its hiring rules should only be 
subjected to rational basis review because they did not mandate 
preferences, quotas, or set-asides.344 The FCC, however, had long 
used the statistical proportionality of broadcasters’ hiring as a flag 
for detailed audits of broadcasters’ compliance with the FCC’s 
equal employment rules. According to the court, in practice this 
policy too strongly encouraged broadcasters to engage in preferen-
tial hiring.345 
The FCC immediately petitioned for a rehearing and a rehearing 
en banc, continuing to implement its rules in the meantime. Later 
that year, a splintered court rejected both petitions, affirming, over 
several vigorous dissents, that the rules violated equal protection.346 
In 1998 the FCC proposed, and in 2000 adopted, new rules that 
sought to avoid the court’s rebuke by focusing on employer re-
cruitment practices. The FCC deemed its new rules race- and gen-
 
343 141 F.3d 344, 354–57 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Lutheran I) (applying strict scrutiny to the 
FCC’s equal employment rules because they require broadcasters to favor minorities 
for jobs, deeming the FCC’s diversity-in-programming rationale not compelling, and 
its means of achieving diversity not sufficiently narrowly tailored). 
344 Id. at 351. 
345 Id. at 351–53. 
346 Lutheran Church v. FCC, 154 F.3d 487, 492–94 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Lutheran II) 
(denying rehearing and reaffirming that the FCC rules’ encouragement of minority 
hiring was a racial classification, triggering strict scrutiny); Lutheran Church v. FCC, 
154 F.3d 494, 495, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Lutheran III) (denying rehearing en banc 
over the dissents of Chief Judge Edwards and Judges Tatel and Wald). 
LEE_POST_EIC 5/19/2010 11:36 AM 
876 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:799 
 
der-neutral and thus not subject to strict scrutiny.347 Again, the 
court struck them down.348 Nonetheless, the FCC did not give up, 
issuing yet another equal employment rule. The FCC’s third and 
final rule essentially retained those aspects of its recruitment-
focused rule that had passed the D.C. Circuit’s muster.349 
This brief rendering implies that the FCC had foresworn the 
administrative constitutionalism of the 1960s and 1970s, but a 
closer examination of the record suggests that it may persist into 
the present day. The FCC, in its back and forth with the D.C. Cir-
cuit, resisted the court’s constitutional interpretation. The FCC did 
not comply with the court’s rulings without putting up a vigorous 
fight. The Lutheran I court noted the extreme lengths to which the 
FCC went to avoid judicial review of its policy.350 After the court’s 
initial decision, the FCC petitioned for rehearings and, while those 
were pending, continued to partially implement its equal employ-
ment rules.351 When the court denied the FCC’s rehearing petitions, 
the FCC decided against asking the Supreme Court to review the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in order to avoid a more final and sweeping 
ruling.352 In addition, when the FCC did comply with the Lutheran 
opinions, it revised the precise rules the court had struck down, but 
said it would continue to enforce similar rules regulating other 
347 Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, FCC 
Pub. 00-20, MM Docket Nos. 98-204 & 96-16 (Feb. 2, 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Bu-
reaus/Mass_Media/Orders/2000/fcc00020.pdf [hereinafter FCC EEO Rules 2000]; Re-
view of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity 
Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, FCC Pub. 
98-305, MM Docket Nos. 98-204 & 96-16 (Nov. 20, 1998), http://www.fcc.gov/Bu-
reaus/Mass_Media/Notices/1998/fcc98305.pdf [hereinafter FCC EEO Rules 1998]. 
348 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
349 Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Rules and Policies, FCC Pub. 02-303, MM Docket No. 98-204 (Nov. 20, 2002) 
[hereinafter FCC EEO Rules 2002]. 
350 Lutheran I, 141 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he Commission has on occasion employed some 
rather unusual legal tactics when it wished to avoid judicial review, but [its efforts to 
get this case remanded so it could tweak its rules] may well take the prize.”). 
351 In re Applications of Radio SunGroup of Tex., Inc., File Nos. BRH-970407WB, 
BR-970317WB, BRH-970317WH (July 23, 1998), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_ 
Media/Orders/1998/fcc98171.txt [hereinafter Radio SunGroup] (issuing a notice of 
apparent liability for violation of the FCC’s equal employment rules but staying im-
position of the sanctions pending court’s final order on the rules). 
352 Neil A. Lewis, F.C.C. Revises Rule on Hiring of Women and Minorities, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 21, 2000, at A16. 
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types of licensees.353 Apparently, the FCC accepted the rule of the 
case, but not necessarily the constitutional theories underlying it. 
In fact, the FCC walked a fine line between complying with 
court constitutionalism and continuing to express its own under-
standing of the Constitution. Both times the FCC proposed and 
then adopted new rules, it explained why the rules would comport 
with the Lutheran opinions and the constitutional concerns voiced 
in the public’s comments.354 The FCC and its Commissioners, how-
ever, also asserted opposing constitutional views. They did not 
have court cases to creatively extend, and they did not attempt to 
creatively narrow Adarand. Instead, they offered their views in less 
legalistic terms. For instance, Democratic Commissioner Susan 
Ness forthrightly stated, “[w]hile I disagree with the Court’s as-
sessment in Lutheran Church that our previous rules violated Con-
stitutional standards, I accept its ruling.”355 Strikingly, the FCC con-
tinued to suggest that its equal employment rules not only 
complied with equal protection but that they also implemented it. 
“Indeed,” the FCC reasoned, “nondiscrimination and inclusive 
outreach requirements like those [in its 2000 rules] advance the 
principle that is at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause: equal 
protection of the laws and equal opportunity for all citizens, re-
gardless of race or gender.”356 In response to the 2001 proposed 
rules, Democratic Commissioner Michael J. Copps distinguished 
what the Constitution required of the FCC from the courts’ con-
straining “legal and judicial boundaries.”357 He reminded that “[t]he 
Constitution has brought us a long ways in civil rights and equal 
353 1998 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Ann. Rep. 15–16. Note that the ultimate rule did 
affect these other regulatees. FCC EEO Rules 2000, supra note 347, ¶ 1; FCC EEO 
Rules 1998, supra note 347, ¶ 46. 
354 FCC EEO Rules 2000, supra note 347, ¶¶ 210–29; FCC EEO Rules 1998, supra 
note 347, ¶¶ 18–23. 
355 FCC EEO Rules 2000, supra note 347, at Separate Statement of Commissioner 
Susan Ness.  
356 Id. ¶ 228 (arguing that it “turns equal protection analysis on its head to suggest 
that” the FCC’s rules that implement equal protection, and which it claimed were 
race- and gender-neutral, would be “suspect under it”). 
357 Separate Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, In the Matter of the 
Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Poli-
cies, MM Docket No. 98-204 (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Copps/ 
Statements/2001/stmjc129.html [hereinafter Copps 2001].  
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opportunity in the past half century.”358 Urging the Commission to 
adopt bolder equal employment rules, he charged, “I just don’t be-
lieve it’s out of gas yet.”359 
The statements of other commissioners suggested more indi-
rectly that the FCC’s equal employment rules implemented consti-
tutional values. Michael Powell, a Republican commissioner, and 
by 2001 the FCC’s Chairman, recognized that the Constitution 
constrained equal employment rules and that the FCC had to com-
ply with the D.C. Circuit’s opinions.360 But he also suggested that 
the rules implemented constitutional values, stating that he “af-
firmatively believe[s] that the courts and the Constitution they in-
terpret continue to abhor discrimination and sanction minimally in-
trusive programs designed to vigilantly guard against it.”361 This 
constitutional abhorrence, he continued, “explains the programs 
we suggest today.”362 
358 Id. 
359 Id. In 1992 the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s grant of a minority set-aside 
to a woman under Metro Broadcasting’s intermediate scrutiny on the grounds that 
there was not empirical evidence linking women’s ownership to programming diver-
sity. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 393–96 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Soon thereafter, Con-
gress amended the Communications Act to bar the FCC from changing its broadcast-
ing equal employment rules, among other of its affirmative action policies. 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 334 (2006). Accordingly, it is notable that, 
in defending those rules after Lutheran I, the Commissioners relied on the Constitu-
tion, not only on Congress, for authority. 
360 See, e.g., Separate Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, Re: Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Poli-
cies, MM Docket No. 98-204 (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/ 
Statements/2001/stmkp145.pdf [hereinafter Powell 2001]; FCC EEO Rules 2000, su-
pra note 347, at Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell. 
361 FCC EEO Rules 1998, supra note 347, at Separate Statement of Commissioner 
Michael K. Powell. 
362 Id.; see also id. at Joint Statement of FCC Chairman William Kennard & Com-
missioner Gloria Tristani (asserting that the rules the FCC proposed after Lutheran 
were part of the nation’s long struggle to “reconcile” its “principles of liberty, justice 
and equality” with “ugly political realities”). The Constitution also informed the 
FCC’s final 2002 rules in ways unacknowledged, and possibly unknown, to the FCC. 
In adopting its 2002 rules, the FCC declined to rely on the service-provision rationale 
the Supreme Court endorsed in NAACP v. FPC. FCC EEO Rules 2002, supra note 
349, at 18. Instead, the FCC returned to the public interest and national antidiscrimi-
nation justifications it had advanced in the late 1960s. Id. at 11. As described above, 
these justifications incorporated constitutional considerations. See supra notes 100–
08, 136–42 and accompanying text. 
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Not all commissioners agreed that the FCC could interpret the 
Constitution independent of the court. When the FCC continued 
to enforce its rules while its rehearing petitions were pending, 
Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, a Republican known 
for his libertarian views, issued a strong and unusually legalistic 
dissent. Quoting Marbury v. Madison, he accused his fellow com-
missioners of failing to demonstrate the respect due democratically 
appointed “Article III judges, whose constitutional duty it is ‘to say 
what the law is.’”363 Furchtgott-Roth’s view, however, was a minor-
ity viewpoint. Into the twenty-first century, administrators contin-
ued to interpret and implement the Constitution in ways that di-
verged from court doctrine. 
The commissioners also differed as to how conservatively they 
should proceed in light of the D.C. Circuit’s decisions. In 2000, 
when the FCC issued its new rules, Furchtgott-Roth elaborated on 
his theory of the relationship between court and administrative 
constitutionalism. In addition to observing strict judicial suprem-
acy, he thought the Commission should refuse to act in the face of 
inconclusive court doctrine, lest its policies fall under a “cloud of 
constitutional doubt.”364 That he felt the need to comment suggests 
that, in his view, his fellow commissioners were willing to venture 
close to the outer limits of court doctrine. This, however, was not 
far enough for every member: Commissioner Copps thought the 
Agency’s 2001 proposed rules were overly conservative.365 In meta-
phor-laden words, he expressed concern that “the reversals by the 
D.C. Circuit have imparted too much caution about even ap-
proaching the borders of circumscription established by the 
Court.”366 Instead, he pressed his colleagues to action, urging that 
“when civil rights are at stake, . . . [o]ur responsibility is . . . to push 
363 Radio SunGroup, supra note 351, at 15276–78 (Furchtgott-Roth, Comm’r, con-
curring in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the nonacquiescence doctrine 
might apply to agencies’ statutory interpretations, “but the justification for such con-
duct dissipates when the case at issue presents a constitutional question”) (emphasis 
added). 
364 FCC EEO Rules 2000, supra note 347, at 17 (Furchtgott-Roth, Comm’r, dissent-
ing). See also Press Release, Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, In the Mat-
ter of Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding (Jan. 
20, 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott_Roth/Statements/2000/sthfr006.html. 
365 Copps 2001, supra note 357. 
366 Id. 
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the edge of the envelope.”367 The Commission, he charged, could 
still “push the envelope farther.”368 
Despite Supreme Court decisions that arguably rendered equal 
employment rules unconstitutional, and even appellate court deci-
sions directly striking the rules down, some resistant administrative 
constitutionalists have continued to adhere to a divergent, even 
conflicting, understanding of equal protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus far, agencies’ interpretation and implementation of the 
Constitution has largely escaped empirical study. Examining the 
history of equal employment rules at the FCC and the FPC alters 
our understanding of constitutional history and of administrative 
agencies’ role in constitutional governance. Throughout the rule-
making campaign, administrators implemented constitutional 
commands the scope and content of which were different from 
those described in court-based legal histories. In particular, they 
embraced a distinct administrative form of affirmative equal pro-
tection duties, broadened the state action doctrine to reach the tra-
ditionally private workplace, and viewed affirmative action policies 
as implementing, rather than violating, equal protection. 
This history demonstrates that the state action doctrine re-
mained a central element of the civil rights Constitution much 
longer than legal historians have recognized. Equal protection his-
tories generally describe sustained challenges to the state action 
doctrine as arising in the 1940s and again, briefly, during the sit-ins 
of the early 1960s.369 During these episodes, courts are depicted as 
using fact-specific doctrines to reach the right result in tough cases, 
without seriously altering the doctrinal division between private 
367 Id. 
368 Id. 
369 See, e.g., Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 227–28, 245–47 
(2007) (describing civil rights challenges to the state action doctrine as ending in the 
early 1950s); Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the 
Supreme Court, 1936–1961, at 233–34, 308–13 (1994) (demonstrating that state action 
challenges re-emerged in the early 1960s in response to the sit-ins); cf. Robert C. Post 
& Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation 
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441, 497–501 (2000) (noting that the state 
action doctrine’s limits on Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment were hotly 
contested in the early 1960s). 
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and public.370 Including administrative constitutionalism in this his-
tory shows that the state action doctrine remained under pressure 
into the 1970s and that government officials were some of its most 
expansive interpreters. 
Equal employment rulemaking also relied on a distinctly af-
firmative understanding of equal protection. The kinds of affirma-
tive equal protection claims lawyers and scholars are most familiar 
with are those pressed in the courts, either by welfare-rights advo-
cates in the late 1960s and 1970s or, more recently, in efforts to win 
state constitutional claims to an adequate education.371 Legal theo-
rists have also argued that the Constitution imposes affirmative 
equal protection duties on the legislative branch. They look to 
Congress to vindicate these exhortatory, rather than justiciable, af-
firmative rights.372 
Equal employment rules relied on a different kind of affirmative 
equal protection than either the judicial or legislative models. 
Agencies’ affirmative equal protection duties might not have been 
enforceable in a court, but neither were they mere textual exhorta-
tions. Although administrators retained leeway in deciding their 
constitutional obligations, the public had formal mechanisms for 
asserting them. These obligations may not have been justiciable, 
but they were administrable. 
Lastly, this history of equal employment rulemaking examines a 
time when equal protection was thought to require, rather than 
constrain, affirmative action. Legal histories of equal protection in 
this period recognize that whether equal protection required race-
conscious remedies was an open question.373 Historians have yet to 
370 Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. 
L. Rev. 213, 270–79 (1991). 
371 For histories of the welfare rights movement, see Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: 
Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960–1973 (1995); Felicia Kornbluh, The 
Battle for Welfare Rights: Politics and Poverty in Modern America (2007). New York 
courts recently ruled that the state constitution guarantees “a sound basic education” 
and ordered the state to allocate sufficient funds to provide one. Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, Inc. v. New York, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 930 (2003). 
372 See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Con-
stitutional Practice 7–9, 93–94 (2004); Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Re-
constructing the Fourteenth Amendment 1–4 (1994). 
373 Siegel, supra note 1, at 1500; see, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the 
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 583–617 (1965) 
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recover, however, the extent to which equal protection was used to 
justify affirmative action. Instead, scholars focus on whether af-
firmative action was understood to violate equal protection.374 As 
this history demonstrates, administrators supported, adopted, and 
enforced affirmative action policies in order to implement their 
understanding of equal protection. 
The history of equal employment rulemaking also has implica-
tions beyond the particulars of the legal interpretations it recovers. 
Extra-court constitutionalists are interested in questions of democ-
ratic responsiveness and constitutional legitimacy that are deeply 
implicated by administrative constitutionalism, but the existing lit-
erature generally reaches only as far into the executive branch as 
the President’s closest legal advisors.375 Administrative law scholars 
engage in theoretical and normative debates about how much ad-
ministrators should defer to court constitutionalism, but there is 
limited understanding of how agencies approach their core task of 
statutory interpretation, let alone how they practice constitutional 
interpretation.376 Nevertheless, as the FCC’s recent equal employ-
ment rulemaking process suggests, administrative constitutionalism 
persists into the present day. Often it is and will be administrators 
who give the Constitution meaning in the first instance.377 
How should these agencies imagine their task? Are they imple-
menters of congressional, presidential, and judicial interpretations, 
or are they constitutional interpreters in their own right? Even if 
administrators accept the more modest task of applying court, ex-
ecutive, or legislative interpretations, how should they bridge the 
inevitable gap that law’s indeterminacy will leave between these in-
terpretations and the concrete circumstances administrators con-
front? Today’s lawyers, activists, administrators, judges, and schol-
ars have to resolve these questions, debating what comprises, in the 
ambiguous words of President Kennedy, a “sound public constitu-
tional policy.”378 
(establishing the basis for an equal protection obligation to ensure equal educational 
opportunity). 
374 Siegel, supra note 1, at 1518–20. 
375 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
376 Mashaw, supra note 14, at 501–02. 
377 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 20, at 223 (noting that the executive branch is often 
the first branch to apply the Constitution to a novel legal problem). 
378 Kennedy Press Conference, supra note 28. 
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The history of equal employment rulemaking offers a novel em-
pirical guide to the practice of administrative constitutionalism. 
First, the Constitution’s influence on administration is not neces-
sarily divulged in public texts such as opinions, orders, and rules. 
Instead, at the FCC and the FPC, the Constitution’s influence of-
ten occurred behind the scenes in inter-agency comments and in-
tra-agency memoranda. Thus, administrators’ understanding of 
whether the Constitution authorizes or compels certain policies 
may never make its way into the Federal Register or agency-
specific reporting services. Nonetheless, many of these views are 
accessible to the public thanks to the National Archives, the Free-
dom of Information Act,379 and, increasingly, the Internet. 
Second, this history suggests that administrators, when consider-
ing the Constitution, may be guided, but are not necessarily bound, 
by court doctrine. In the early days of equal employment rulemak-
ing, administrators’ comments and memos drew on Supreme Court 
doctrine for authority, but also showed a willingness to extend 
these principles in ways the Court had not. Practicing creative in-
terpretation, attorneys and officials drew on cases such as Burton 
that addressed leasing to imagine the constitutional implications of 
quite distinct regulatory relationships. Some also looked to the 
constitutional opinions of other agencies, such as those expressed 
by the NLRB in Hughes Tool.380 Even after the Supreme Court is-
sued decisions that suggested it would not uphold these administra-
tors’ state action theories if it were asked to do so, selective inter-
preters at the FCC continued to endorse an affirmative and broad 
understanding of regulators’ and regulatees’ equal protection obli-
gations. Finally, when the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s rules 
as a violation, rather than a vindication, of equal protection, the 
FCC complied with the court’s judgment, but continued to express 
a resistant interpretation of its rules as implementing equal protec-
tion. 
Third, while constitutional advocacy in regulatory agencies in-
volved many standard lawyering tools, from brief writing to battles 
over the scope of discovery, it was also shaped by forces alien to 
court adjudication: popular letter-writing campaigns, congressional 
379 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
380 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). 
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hearings, legislative threats, presidential nudging, public hearings, 
and the constitutional interpretations of other administrators. At 
the same time, the partisan balance of the independent agencies 
and the frequent appointments process sometimes altered its 
course. Nixon’s appointment of John Nassikas to lead the FPC 
took administrative constitutionalism in a different direction than 
it was headed when Lee White was the Agency’s chair. Likewise, 
the FCC’s recent approach to equal employment rulemaking had 
to be forged from quite divergent legal and political perspectives. 
In this sense, it would be wrong to judge administrative constitu-
tionalism as entirely unaccountable; instead, it was fed, shaped, and 
constrained by popular and democratic pressures. 
At the same time, administrative constitutionalism cannot be re-
duced to an instance of legislative or executive constitutionalism. If 
President Kennedy inspired attorneys at the FCC and PCEEO to 
action, these administrators interpreted state action more broadly 
than Kennedy’s legal advisors would. The FCC’s broad interpreta-
tion of state action persisted long past Kennedy’s death and John-
son’s trouncing at the polls, and despite Nixon’s appointment of an 
anti-regulation, anti-civil rights chairman.381 The FCC’s view that its 
rules implemented equal protection survived through the Reagan-
era 1980s and on into the second Bush presidency. If the FCC 
demonstrates that administrative constitutionalism had a degree of 
independence from the Executive, the FPC’s history emphasizes 
the same vis-à-vis Congress. Notably, to the extent that Congress 
addressed the FPC’s equal employment responsibilities, it was to 
encourage them in committee hearings or to refuse to repudiate 
them in the Senate’s Exclusive Remedy vote. 
Fourth, administrative constitutionalism should be taken seri-
ously, even when an agency publicly rests its actions as much—or 
even exclusively—on its statutory authority. If an agency invokes 
statutory authority to justify its action, as the FCC did in issuing its 
equal employment rules, the background constitutional support for 
the action is still relevant. Statutory discretion, especially post-
381 For most of the period this history covers, Congress did not exert much influence 
on appointments. Erwin G. Krasnow & Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics of Broad-
cast Regulation 84 (1978) (observing that until 1973, the Senate “usually contented 
itself with a passive ‘rubber stamp’ role” in the confirmation process). 
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Chevron, is the essence of administration.382 There will always be 
myriad policies an agency can adopt under its statutes, but does 
not. When the sphere of policymaking discretion is broad, a sense 
that the Constitution compels, or even merely supports, a certain 
action may help turn a statutory can-do into a policy will-do. For 
instance, the FCC and early FPC interpreted the “public interest” 
language in their statutes quite differently than did the FPC under 
Nassikas because they differed as to whether the Constitution au-
thorized, perhaps even required, agencies to regulate workplace 
discrimination. Such underlying constitutional interpretations do 
reside in the eventual policies, even if their presence is not ex-
plicit.383 
Finally, this history has focused on administrators who creatively 
extended, selectively relied on, or actively resisted court doctrine. 
Even an administrator who wishes to cleave cautiously to court 
doctrine, however, will often find gaping interpretive spaces be-
tween the decisions on the books and their practical application. 
For instance, agencies that contemplate equal employment rules in 
the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s decisions will hardly find a clear map 
of the permissible. The court stated, on the one hand, that not “all 
race conscious measures adopted by the government must be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny” but, on the other hand, that the FCC’s 
“regulations . . . must be subjected to strict scrutiny because they 
encourage racial preferences in hiring.”384 In such instances, it is 
important to uncover, analyze, and debate administrators’ practice 
of constitutional meaning making. Whether creative, selective, re-
382 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984) (giving varying degrees of deference to agencies’ statutory determinations); cf. 
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 15, at 1091, 1179 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court 
applies varying degrees of deference to agency action and that Chevron governs few 
of the Court’s decisions). 
383 Similarly, those who debate courts’ use of the avoidance canon agree that doing 
so involves implementing the Constitution. Compare Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 
(1983) (arguing that courts’ use of the avoidance canon creates an undesirable “judge-
made constitutional ‘penumbra’”), with Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, 
Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 
1585 (2000) (defending the avoidance canon and recognizing that when a court ap-
plies it, “the court has made a constitutional decision”). 
384 Lutheran Church v. FCC (Lutheran II), 154 F.3d 487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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sistant, or cleaving, administrators’ interpretations help determine 
what it means, in practice, to be governed by the Constitution. 
This history of administrative constitutionalism raises difficult 
normative, theoretical, and empirical questions. How representa-
tive is this history?385 Are there legal and theoretical justifications 
for administrators’ divergent constitutional interpretations?386 Even 
if justifiable, are such interpretations desirable? This last question 
may be the most vexing.387 Regardless of the pros and cons of ad-
ministrative constitutionalism, it is probably ineluctable. Our cur-
rent circumstances—a Court soon to be flush with new appoint-
ments, a Congress passing novel and ambitious laws, and a 
President who has charged regulators with a mandate for change—
will likely feed, not dampen, its development. 
This account of equal employment rulemaking notwithstanding, 
we still know little about the full scope and range of administrative 
constitutionalism and about the principles and forces that guide 
administrators in their interpretations. Studying these subjects fur-
ther will advance our understanding of constitutional law and ad-
ministrative practice. It will also provide crucial guidance to those 
who are called upon to implement or evaluate future instances of 
administrative constitutionalism. 
 
385 There are indications that this history is not anomalous. See supra note 12. 
386 There are separation of powers and institutional competency reasons for the 
Constitution to look different from an agency perspective. For instance, scholars ar-
gue that agencies, when interpreting their statutes, may not need to avoid constitu-
tional questions in the same way that courts do since they do not share courts’ reasons 
for treading lightly on the legislative branch. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 507–09; 
Strauss, supra note 14, at 114. Affirmative rights may be another area where adminis-
trative and court constitutionalism should differ. Courts have abjured affirmative 
rights claims for separation of powers and institutional competency reasons that do 
not apply to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 
487 (1970) (“[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems pre-
sented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.”); see 
also supra notes 371–73 and accompanying text; cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme 
than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Su-
premacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 311–14 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court in-
creasingly assumes policymaking responsibilities properly left to Congress). 
387 Metzger, supra note 5, at 521–24, 527–30, does not address how administrators 
should consider the Constitution when designing and implementing policy; she makes 
a strong normative argument, however, that they should be encouraged to do so. 
